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Abstract
A central institution of US trade policy is Fast-Track Authority (FT), by which
Congress commits not to amend a trade agreement that is presented to it for ratifica-
tion, but to subject the agreement to an up-or-down vote.
We oﬀer a new interpretation of FT based on a hold-up problem. If the US gov-
ernment negotiates a trade agreement with the government of a smaller economy, as
the negotiations proceed, businesses in the partner economy, anticipating the opening
of the US market to their goods, may make sunk investments to take advantage of
the US market, such as quality upgrades to meet the expectations of the demanding
US consumer. As a result, when the time comes for ratification of the agreement, the
partner economy will be locked in to the US market in a way it was not previously.
At this point, if Congress is able to amend the agreement, the partner country has
less bargaining power than it did ex ante, and so Congress can make changes that are
adverse to the partner. As a result, if the US wants to convince such a partner country
to negotiate a trade deal, it must first commit not to amend the agreement ex post. In
this situation, FT is Pareto-improving.
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1 Introduction
A central institution of US trade policy is the practice by which Congress from time to time
commits in advance not to amend a trade agreement that is presented to it for ratification,
but to subject the agreement to an up-or-down vote. This institution, which delegates a
portion of Congress’ authority to the executive branch, has been called Fast-Track Authority
(FT) in the past, and is often now referred to as Trade-Promotion Authority.
Fast Track has at times been intensely controversial, and recent debates over it have
borne this out. The most recent bill to enact Fast-Track Authority (H.R. 3830, named the
“Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014,” introduced to the House of Rep-
resentatives on January 9, 2014) was opposed strenuously by such groups as the AFL-CIO,
which called it ‘bad for democracy and bad for America’ (www.aflcio.org). The argument
that FT is incompatible with democracy is not new, as Koh (1992) and Tucker and Wallach
(2008) discuss at length.
A natural question is why Congress would ever be interested in delegating any of its
authority in this way. There have been a number of interpretations suggested, but we oﬀer
in this paper a new interpretation of FT based on a hold-up problem. In brief, if the US
government negotiates a trade agreement with the government of a smaller economy, then
as the negotiations proceed, businesses in the partner economy, anticipating the opening of
the US market to their goods, may make investments to prepare to take advantage of the
US market — quality upgrades to meet the expectations of the demanding US consumer,
changes in packaging and adjustments to US regulations, searching for and negotiating with
US partner firms to develop marketing channels, and so on. A portion of these investments
are likely to be sunk and specific to the US market. As a result, when the time comes for
ratification of the final agreement, the partner economy will be locked in to the US market
in a way it was not previously. At this point, if Congress is able to amend the agreement,
the partner country has less bargaining power than it did ex ante, and so Congress can
make changes that are adverse to the partner but beneficial to the US. Given the ex post
diminution of the partner country’s bargaining power due to the sunk investments, it may
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well acquiesce in these changes, thereby accepting an agreement that makes it worse oﬀ than
if it had never negotiated with the US at all. As a result, if the US wants to convince such a
partner country to negotiate a trade deal, it must commit first not to amend the agreement
ex post — the purpose of Fast-Track Authority.1
This interpretation joins a number of others that have been suggested by other authors.
Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) suggest that FT is used to avoid a ‘log-rolling’ problem, in
which Congress would otherwise be stuck in a bad equilibrium whereby each member votes
for trade protection for other members’ constituent industries in return for protection for
its own. Delegation to the President is seen as a way of reaching a Pareto-superior outcome
of more open trade. Conconi et al. (2012) suggest that FT can be understood as strategic
delegation in bargaining with the foreign government; the median member of Congress may
be less protectionist than the executive branch, and thus if all of the bargaining authority
is delegated to the executive branch a tougher bargain will be reached with the foreign
government. Celik et al. (2015) suggest that FT may be a way to get out of an ineﬃcient
congressional bargaining equilibrium in which each member tries to secure the maximum
possible protection rents for her own constituents and to cobble together a bare protectionist
majority coalition to achieve it. Amador and Bagwell (2018) suggest that Congress may
delegate trade policy authority if the executive branch has superior information, for example
about the foreign partner’s ability to commit not to invoke hidden forms of protection.2
It is possible that each of these interpretations contains an important part of the story,
but at the same time they all miss something: They do not explain why the partner country
government would need FT in order to be willing to negotiate with the US.
This insistence is emphasized by Hermann von Bertrab, who was the chief negotiator
for the Mexican government on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in
1It can be objected that Congress could always pass a repeal of its FT power immediately before the
ratification is due, thus undoing the commitment. This is technically true, if the President could be persuaded
to sign such a bill, but such a move would be extremely costly to Congress as a matter of reputation. We
assume, in eﬀect, that the reputational damage would be suﬃcient deterrent.
2Their main question is why Congress has in the past often used a tariﬀ floor as the form of delegation,
such as was often the case under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
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his memoir of the negotiation process (Bertrab, 1997). His interpretation of Fast Track is
that it “grew out of a perceived need to negotiate with other countries in good faith,” and
that “Foreign countries would otherwise hesitate even to begin the process of negotiations.”
(p. 1) His account makes it clear that Congressional passage of Fast Track was viewed by
Mexican oﬃcials as an irreplaceable precondition for negotiations even to begin.
More broadly, the view that partner countries need FT in order to have the ‘confidence’
required to negotiate a trade agreement with the US is expressed frequently by observers of
the history and politics of FT. For example, a report on the merits of FT renewal prepared
for the House Ways and Means Committee in 2007 explains: “trade promotion authority
gives U.S. trading partners confidence that an agreement agreed to by the United States will
not be reopened during the implementing process (Committee on Finance, United States
Senate, 2007, p. 34).” Similarly, from a Senate report: “A foreign country may be reluctant
to conclude negotiations with the United States faced with uncertainty as to whether and
when a trade agreement will come up for approval by Congress. Likewise, a country may be
reluctant to make concessions, knowing that it may have to renegotiate following Congress’
initial consideration of the agreement (p. 36).” In both cases, the emphasis is on convincing
the foreign government to participate, using FT as a commitment. Koh (1992, p. 148)
explains that “it bolstered the Executive Branch’s negotiating credibility with the United
States allies, which had suﬀered serious damage during the Kennedy Round, by reassuring
trading partners that negotiated trade agreements would undergo swift and nonintrusive
legislative consideration.” As one pundit put it, “Many in Congress view Fast Track as a
hammer to drive reluctant nations to the negotiating table because what’s agreed to between
the dealmakers cannot be changed by those picky partisans in Congress (Guebert, 2014).”3
None of the interpretations listed above can accommodate this concern. Lohmann and
O’Halloran’s (1994) and Celik et al.’s (2015) interpretations show why a foreign partner
3This is also in line with then-White House Chief of Staﬀ Erskine Bowles (1997) arguing that Fast
Track would give the president “the credibility to negotiate tough trade deals because other nations know
agreements will not be reopened provision-by-provision by Congress,” and Bagwell (1997) arguing that
without Fast Track the president’s “ability to negotiate valuable trade agreements with foreign trading
partners would be compromised.”
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might be more eager to negotiate under FT, but provide no reason to think that the foreign
partner would be better oﬀ refusing negotiations in the absence of FT, as long as the partner
can always turn down the final agreement. Conconi et al.’s (2012) interpretation, of course,
is a reason the partner should be less eager to negotiate when FT is in place. Only the
hold-up interpretation explains why FT may be necessary in order for the partner country
to have the ‘confidence’ required to agree to negotiations in the first place.
One major innovation of the current paper is to introduce such strategic considerations
into a model in which the policy variables are not tariﬀs but rather rules of origin (ROO).
This is realistic in the context of free trade agreements, since WTO rules require internal
tariﬀs in a free-trade agreement to be set equal to zero, but ROO’s can be set as part of the
agreement in a restrictive manner that reduces or eliminates the benefits of tariﬀ reductions.
In general, an ROO is an agreed-upon rule for which products can be considered to have
originated in the countries that are parties to a free-trade agreement, and therefore are
eligible to be shipped from one member country to another tariﬀ-free. ROO’s take several
forms, but the form we focus on for tractability is a rule that specifies a minimum content
requirement; for example, within the context of NAFTA, a rule that specifies what fraction
of the costs of a given product must be accounted for by North-American produced inputs
or North-American labor. ROO’s are an appropriate focus for studying the negotiation
of free-trade agreements, since they are in practice a focus of much (perhaps most) of the
contentious issues. For a recent example, US negotiators have indicated tightening ROO’s as
a key priority in the proposed re-negotiation of NAFTA.4 Intense lobbying over ROO’s was
highlighted by critics of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),5 and ROO’s for textiles and
shoes were the main point of contention for EU negotiations over free trade with Vietnam.6
The analysis of optimal (and equilibrium) ROO’s is qualitatively quite diﬀerent from
4Ana Swanson, “Trump Team Readies for Nafta Fight Over Making Goods in America,” New York Times,
September 22, 2017.
5Mike Masnick, “Revealed Emails Show How Industry Lobbyists Basically Wrote The TPP,”
TechDirt.com, June 8, 2015.
6Danny Hakim and Tuan Nguyen, “To Lower Tariﬀs, Vietnam Pushes for Easing Trade Rules,” New York
Times, December 13, 2013.
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the corresponding analysis of tariﬀs. It turns out that optimal ROO’s quite often take the
form of a corner solution, and when ROO’s serve a protectionist function there are cases in
which an increase in protectionism can worsen rather than improve the terms of trade of the
country using it. These are starkly diﬀerent from results obtained with tariﬀs. We allow for
ROO’s to be set diﬀerently for diﬀerent industries, so both the level and the inter-industry
pattern of ROO’s are endogenous. We show conditions such that in equilibrium the ex ante
optimal level of ROO’s from the US point of view are not optimal ex post, after the partner
country’s firms have sunk their investments. Ex post, Congress would want to tighten those
ROO’s, extracting more rents from the partner country. This is the source of the hold-up
problem that emerges, and is a major departure from the earlier FT papers, all of which
focus on tariﬀs.
Historical background. Useful concise histories of Fast Track can be found in Smith
(2006), Tucker and Wallach (2008), and Fergusson (2015). Fast-Track Authority grew out of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which gave congressional approval in advance
to trade agreements that satisfied a number of listed criteria. The pre-approval was limited
to tariﬀs. This act was re-approved in various forms over the following decades, finally in
the form of the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of 1962.
The US employed an idiosyncratic system for determining ‘fair market value’ for purposes
of setting anti-dumping duties, called the ‘American Selling Price’ (ASP). As part of its
negotiations in the Kennedy Round of the GATT, the Johnson administration agreed to
a major overhaul of the ASP. The tariﬀ part of the Kennedy Round entered into US law
automatically under the TEA, but the reform of the ASP was rejected in a Senate vote.
Since it was an agreement on a non-tariﬀ measure, it was beyond the bounds of the TEA
(Tucker and Wallach, 2008, pp. 45-46).
In 1973, Richard Nixon cited the ASP debacle as a precedent that must not be repeated,
and called for trade negotiation authority to encompass all aspects of a trade agreement.
This led to the Trade Act of 1974, which created Fast-Track Authority in its modern form.
It required Congress to be notified of negotiations in advance, and to be briefed on the
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progress of negotiations along the way, while at the end within a 90-day window Congress
was required to give the entire agreement an up-or-down vote with no amendments, not
merely the portions that dealt with tariﬀs per se (Tucker and Wallach, 2008, pp. 55-56). It
was controversial from the start; Representative James Burke declared in an apoplectic floor
speech: “How. . .Congress a few weeks [after the Tonkin Gulf incident] can even contemplate
abdicating authority in the foreign trade area is beyond my comprehension” (p. 63).
Fast Track thus resulted from one case in which Congress delivered a major humiliation to
a President by refusing to honor part of a trade agreement, and was seen as a significant del-
egation of congressional power. The authority was renewed a number of times subsequently,
lapsing from 1984 to 2002, and then again from 2007 to 2015 (renewed most recently as
part of Public Law No: 114-26) (see Fergusson, 2015). Almost all major trade agreements
into which the US has entered have been negotiated under FT to some degree; the only
agreements negotiated without FT at all are the Canada-US Auto Pact of 1965 (Tucker and
Wallach, 2008, pp. 43-45) and the free-trade agreement with Jordan (Okun-Kozlowicki and
Horwitz, 2013, p. 4).7 However, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was negotiated with-
out FT, under anticipation that FT would be passed by the time of the ratification process
(Okun-Kozlowicki and Horwitz, 2013, p. 7). (That turned out to be correct, but it was
a moot point because the executive branch eventually withdrew from the agreement.) We
will return in the conclusion to the small number of anomalous cases of agreements signed
without FT.
Prior work. In formalizing our interpretation of Fast-Track Authority, we draw on a
wide range of prior work. The idea that firms wishing to export to a given destination must
make sunk investments to do so has been explored in many ways. Verhoogen (2008) shows
that Mexican firms that begin to export to the US typically upgrade their quality of goods
intended for the US market. Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) show how the need to upgrade
quality for a high-income export market helps fit firm-level data on trade flows. Handley
7The free-trade agreement with South Korea was ratified under FT in 2010, even though by then the
statute had expired, because the administration had submitted the first version of the agreement to Congress
before the deadline in 2007 (Schott, 2010).
6
(2012) and Handley and Limão (2015) show that sunk costs to export to a specific destination
can help explain the response of trade flows to uncertainty about trade policy. For example,
they show that a significant portion of the trade response observed when Portugal joined the
European Economic Community (EEC) can be explained by the elimination of uncertainty
about EEC tariﬀs against Portugal.8
The eﬀects of sunk costs or anticipatory investment on equilibrium policy have been
studied from a number of angles. Staiger and Tabellini (1989) study time consistency of
optimal policy when private resource allocation decisions are made in anticipation of policy.
McLaren (1997) shows how anticipatory investment can cause a small country to suﬀer from
a hold-up problem in liberalizing trade with a larger one, and McLaren (2002) shows how
similar considerations can lead to the world dividing up into ineﬃcient, exclusionary trade
blocks rather than multilateral free trade. Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2007) show how
similar considerations can motivate a trade agreement as a commitment device to hedge
against the influence of domestic political interest groups. Chisik (2003) shows how sunk
investments in an export sector can result in gradualism in bilateral trade liberalization as a
way of softening incentive-compatibility constraints worsened by the hold-up problem. Chisik
(2012) shows that in the presence of periodic trade wars or disputes between trade partners
export-sector firms can be deterred from making sunk investments in product quality.
We also make use of tools from the literature on the eﬀects of ROO’s. Grossman (1981)
studies domestic content rules, whose properties are almost identical to ROO’s, while Krishna
and Krueger (1995) study a simple model of ROO’s, showing how equilibrium is changed
qualitatively when the ROO is strict enough that firms have no incentive to comply with
it. Falvey and Reed (2002) study a model of optimal tariﬀ preferences and ROO’s for a
country that imports a final good and does not produce the input required for it. Ju and
Krishna (2005) show that the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to ROO’s in
8Sunk investments and hold-up in trade are important for diﬀerent reasons in the industrial-organization
literature. Ornelas and Turner (2008; 2011) show how import tariﬀs can aﬀect organizational form decisions
by firms that need specialized inputs in a setting with incomplete contracting. For example, a tariﬀ reduction
can induce a downstream firm to integrate vertically with its foreign supplier, magnifying the eﬀect of trade
liberalization on trade flows.
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a free-trade agreement have important non-monotonicities when the compliance constraint
becomes binding. Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007) show how ROO’s can make a free-trade
agreement politically feasible (possibly at the same time making it ineﬃcient). Overviews are
provided by Falvey and Reed (1998) and Krishna (2006). Empirically, Anson et al. (2005)
use a qualitative measure of restrictiveness of ROO’s to show that more restrictive ROO’s in
NAFTA tend to reduce Mexican exports to the US, ceteris paribus. Conconi et al. (2018),
also focussing on NAFTA, show that inputs with more ROO’s attached to them tend to have
lower imports into Mexico from the rest of the world, ceteris paribus.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on ROO’s an analysis of the optimal profile of
ROO’s across industries in a model with many industries, each of which draws inputs from
many industries, which is quite diﬀerent from what emerges in a model with one final good
and one tradeable input.9 One highlight is the finding that equilibrium ROO policy treats
diﬀerent industries very diﬀerently even if the industries are symmetric. Another is to show
that the eﬀect of ROO’s can be qualitatively diﬀerent in the presence of strong backward
and forward linkages compared to weak ones.
Anticipatory sunk costs in exporting: Examples. Our model is based on the assumption
that at least a portion of the investment that firms need to make to take advantage of
an export opportunity are sunk and time-sensitive, so that firms see a need to invest in
anticipation of a new trade agreement rather than waiting until it is completed. Examples
of this sort of investment are abundant.
For example, in 1988, before the Canada-US Free-Trade Agreement (CUFTA) was rat-
ified, Dupont Canada increased its capital spending plans by 50% in anticipation of the
agreement, particularly in modernizing and expanding capacity in synthetic fibers, plastics,
and films largely for export to the US. To quote a news article immediately after ratifica-
tion:10
As a result of new capacity already put in place this year in anticipation of the
9In this regard, we do something for ROO’s analogous to what Costinot et al. (2015) do for tariﬀs.
10“Trade accord prompts Du Pont Canada spending spree,” by Patricia Lush, The Globe and Mail, Sat-
urday, December 3, 1988.
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free-trade agreement, Du Pont Canada expects to increase its exports by 40 per
cent next year to $335-million, with 90 per cent going to the United States.
It was a gamble, [Dupont CEO] Mr. Newall admitted. “Imagine how we would
have felt had it [CUFTA] not gone forward.”
In the mid-1980’s, anticipating that a CUFTA or something similar was ‘inevitable,’
the leadership of John Labatt Ltd., the largest Canadian brewery, began to invest in a US
distribution network, acquiring 16 US companies to do so.11 On a smaller scale, Vineland
Estate Wines Ltd. of Ontario launched a major marketing push in the US in early 1988 in
anticipation of the agreement, holding numerous wine tastings in New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia with a goal of exporting a quarter of its output to the US in the first year of
the agreement; and Canadian consultant firms such as Samson Belair and Fasken Martineau
Walker were doing brisk business advising firms on how to adapt to the new environment the
agreement would create if ratified.12 Of course, all such consultant fees are sunk investments.
Portugal’s negotiations to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1980’s
provide additional examples. In 1983, Samsung announced plans to build a factory for color
televisions in Portugal “because of its location, reasonable labour costs and forthcoming EEC
membership,” even though the accession negotiations would continue for years afterward.13
Similarly, in the early 1980’s, the Portuguese textile industry saw a huge boom in investment
and modernization in anticipation of the likely accession. One example is the Arco company,
which purchased 380 state-of-the-art looms and 30,000 new spindles to gear up for export.
“Much of the new investment has been made with the specific intention of getting the
industry ready for the EEC,” reported a journalist covering the industry.14
Similar examples can be found in the negotiation and ratification period for NAFTA.
In March 1993, Cone Mills announced a plan for an $80-100 million denim plant in Mexico
11“The Canadians Look South,” by D’Arcy Jenish, Maclean’s, September 19, 1988, p. 39.
12“Winning the Trade Battle,” by D’Arcy Jenish, Macleans, September 19, 1988, p. 32 and p. 33,
respectively.
13“South Korean Television Venture in Portugal,” by Diana Smith, Financial Times, March 31, 1982, p.
6.
14“Heavy Investment in Modern Machinery,” by Anthony Moreton, Financial Times, September 14, 1983,
Section VI, p. VI.
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“in anticipation of the North American Free Trade Agreement” even though its ratification
was by no means guaranteed.15 Stevens (1998) finds evidence of a big upswing in US direct
investment in Mexico in the years before NAFTA, which he interprets as anticipatory to the
agreement.
More examples can be found in Freund and McLaren (1999, pp. 22-24). Of course we
do not claim that all investments for exporting are of this character, but we can state with
confidence that sunk anticipatory investments are common and quite important in practice.
To summarize: This paper oﬀers three pieces of value-added. (1) We present an inter-
pretation of FT that is more consistent with observed behavior and statements of decision
makers than alternatives that have been studied in the past.
(2) We present tools for analyzing ROO’s as the strategic variable instead of tariﬀs. These
tools are likely to be widely useful beyond the analysis of FT because they are the key choice
variables in free-trade agreements. Indeed, as of this writing they are the topic of major
announcements regarding negotiations on NAFTA revisions (Bown (2018)).
(3) We do this in the context of a model with backward and forward linkages, which can
have a profound eﬀect on the way the hold-up problem works and even change its direction
(unlike simpler hold-up models such as McLaren (1997)). As we discuss in the final section,
this may help us understand some of the unusual cases in which FT does not seem to have
been necessary.
In the following section we lay out the model, including consumption, production, bar-
gaining, and how ROO’s work. The following three sections show how the model works
under FT: Section 3 derives equilibrium conditions under FT including the form of optimal
ROO policy; Section 4 shows how to calculate welfare; and Section 5 derives the full equilib-
rium under FT. Section 6 analyzes the equilibrium without FT. Section 7 then analyzes the
choice of whether or not to use FT in the case of weak backward and forward linkages, while
Section 8 discusses the case with strong linkages. The last section summarizes our results
and concludes.
15“Cone Mills Expanding to Mexico Labor Leaders Criticize Deal,” by Susan Harte,. Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, March 30, 1993, Section E, p. 1.
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2 Model
2.1 Overview.
In order to have a discussion of a free-trade agreement with ROO’s, we need to have at
least two member countries plus at least one non-member country. Accordingly, our model
includes the US, a partner country that we will call Mexico (M), and a non-member country
(N). Further, in order to allow for US policy on ROO’s to pose a potential hold-up threat, it
must be the case that Mexican manufacturers produce using both North-American-produced
inputs, which for concreteness we assume are produced in Mexico, and non-member produced
imported inputs. In order for the ROO to have a possibility of being satisfied in non-trivial
cases, it must be possible for Mexican manufacturers to raise their domestic content, which
implies that it is possible to substitute Mexican-produced inputs at least partially for non-
member produced inputs. We allow this by specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function
for Mexican manufactures that takes as arguments a composite of non-member-produced
inputs, Mexican-produced inputs, and labor.
We model Mexican manufactures as produced in a monopolistically-competitive sector,
which allows for the number of varieties produced to adjust to policy as an important en-
dogenous outcome. To avoid an artificial separation between producers of industrial inputs
and producers of final goods, we adopt the convenience of assuming that all manufactured
goods are both final goods and inputs, just as in Krugman and Venables (1995) or Eaton
and Kortum (2002). This creates a situation in which backward and forward linkages are
important: An increase in demand for Mexican products can increase the range of Mexi-
can inputs produced, lowering marginal costs for all Mexican firms. The strength of these
backward and forward linkages will be an important factor in the analysis.
Some stylized simplifications in our model should be pointed out. First, we are not in-
terested in the details of either the US or non-member economy, so these essentially both
become single-product endowment economies, the US producing a numeraire consumption
good, and the non-member country producing a composite input. Second, we are not in-
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terested in conflict of interest between members of Congress or between Congress and the
President, since those issues have been carved out in great detail in the other FT papers
reviewed above and are not important to the hold-up problem that is our focus.16 Therefore,
we implicitly assume that each congressional district has the same economic features, so that
all members of Congress have the same preferences over policy, and so does the executive
branch.
The inter-governmental bargaining structure is very simple. There are two periods. If
Mexico agrees to negotiate, in period 1 the US executive branch makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, which the government of Mexico either accepts or rejects. At the same time, each
Mexican firm decides whether or not to undertake a sunk investment in quality upgrade,
which is essential to export to the US market. In period 2, if FT has been enacted, the US
Congress either accepts or rejects the agreement that was struck in period 1 between the two
governments, and production and consumption occur, whether there is an agreement or not.
If FT has not been enacted, then Congress may amend it; if the amendments are accepted
by the Mexican government, the amended agreement goes into force, otherwise there is no
agreement.
[Insert Timeline Figure here]
2.2 Consumption.
Each individual has an identical utility function given by
 =
³0

´µ 
1− 
¶1−
, 0    1 (1)
where 0 is a homogenous numeraire good,  is a composite good and  represents the
constant share of income that is spent on 0. Let  and  denote total spending and the
aggregate price of the composite good, respectively. Solving the consumer’s utility maxi-
mization problem yields
0 =  and  = (1− ) . (2)
16See also Celik et al. (2013) for legislative trade policy-making when there is conflict of interest between
members of Congress.
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The composite good  is represented by the analogue of the Cobb-Douglas utility function
for a continuum of goods
ln =
1Z
=0
ln,
where  represents consumption of a composite good made up of varieties of products
produced by industry  ∈ [0 1]. If the set of products available in industry  is Ω ⊂ <, then
aggregate consumption in industry  is
 =
⎛
⎜⎝
Z
∈Ω
()
⎞
⎟⎠
1

, 0    1,
which is a CES function of the consumption of diﬀerent varieties of (). The elasticity of
substitution between varieties is given by 1
1− . The range of will be endogenously determined
in equilibrium.
We can derive consumer demand for a variety  in industry , (), from the minimization
problem given by
min()
Z
∈Ω
()() s.t.  =
⎛
⎜⎝
Z
∈Ω
()
⎞
⎟⎠
1

,
which yields
() =
µ()

¶ 1−1 , (3)
where  =
Ã R
∈Ω
() −1
!−1
represents the aggregate price of composite industry 
good, .
Next, we can find the demand function for a composite industry good , , in a similar
fashion as
min
1Z
=0
 s.t. ln =
1Z
=0
ln,
which yields
 =  , (4)
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where the price of the composite good is given by  = 
1
=0
ln
. In addition, using equations
(2), (3), and (4), we obtain
() =
µ()
 
¶ 1−1
(1− ) . (5)
2.3 Production.
The numeraire good is produced in the US with labor alone such that one unit of labor
produces one unit of output. On the other hand, each Mexican diﬀerentiated-product man-
ufacturing firm  produces output () following the production function
() =
µ()

¶ µ ()
1− 
¶1−
, 0    1
where () and () are respectively the amount of composite manufactured input and
labor used by firm  in industry , and  is the output elasticity of the composite input.
Accordingly, the marginal cost function for a typical Mexican firm in industry  that is not
constrained by a rule of origin is given by
 =   ∗1−, (6)
where  is the cost of composite manufactured inputs and ∗ is the wage in Mexico. (The
case of a constrained firm will be discussed later.) The total cost of producing () units of
output is then given as
() =   ∗1− (() +  ) ,
where the cost function involves   ∗1− (marginal cost) and   ∗1− (fixed overhead
cost).17
In order to export to the US, a Mexican firm must incur an additional fixed cost,
  ∗1−, which we interpret as a quality upgrade. Importantly, the quality upgrade cost
is sunk; a firm must incur this cost in period 1 in order to be ready to export in period 2.
17For analytical convenience, we model the fixed cost as denominated in units of output.
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The fixed cost of production is not sunk, however; a firm that has not invested in the quality
upgrade can shut down in period 2, thereby avoiding all costs.
The assumption that a quality upgrade is necessary for export is well-founded empirically.
Verhoogen (2008) shows that among Mexican firms, exporting to the US is correlated with
upgrades in quality as indicated by ISO 9000 compliance and purchase of more expensive
inputs. Iacovone and Javorcik (2012) follow individual products produced by Mexican man-
ufacturing firms, and find that firms that begin to export to the US tend to upgrade quality
as measured by a rise in unit value relative to the same product produced by other firms,
and the upgrade takes place one year before the beginning of exporting. Future changes in
US tariﬀs against Mexico are used as instruments to establish that the quality upgrades are
caused by anticipated export opportunities rather than the reverse.
2.4 Cost of composite input.
The price index for the composite input produced by industry  is
 =
⎛
⎜⎝
Z
∈Ω
() −1
⎞
⎟⎠
−1

,
where () is the price charged by firm  in industry  Given the symmetry of each variety,
for a purchaser of inputs from industry  in Mexico we have
 = 
−1

 , (7)
where  is the price of any given variety in industry  and  is the number of varieties
produced.
The price of the overall composite Mexico-produced input is
 = 
 1
0 ln.
In the event that all industries price the same way, this will collapse to  =  for any
 ∈ [0 1]. This will be combined with the inputs produced abroad to make up the overall
composite input price.
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The composite input is produced from the Mexican-produced composite and an input
from the non-member country through a Cobb-Douglas production function with a weight
of  on the Mexican composite,18 so that the unit cost is
(  ) =   1− , 0    1 (8)
where  is the price of composite Mexican input, and  is the price of the non-member
country input, which we take as fixed. The value  shows how much of a Mexican firm’s cost
is made up of purchases from other Mexican firms, and can be interpreted as a measure of
backward and forward linkages: The extent to which a new Mexican firm generates demand
for the output of other Mexican firms, and the extent to which it provides inputs that will be
useful to other Mexican firms. We will impose the following parameter restriction throughout
   (9)
This is the parameter region of interest because, as shown later in Proposition 8, it is where
the US government would want a positive tariﬀ (and it also guarantees stability of the
equilibrium).19
2.5 Pricing and output per firm.
In this section, we will analyze each firm’s profit maximization problem. The profits of a
firm that produces variety  in sector  are
 = ()()−   ∗1− (() +  )
= ()
³
()−   ∗1−
´
−   ∗1− .
Since for each product both the consumer demand (from (5)) and the intermediate-input
demand has constant elasticity equal to 1(1− ), maximizing this expression with respect
18More precisely, for each Mexican firm  in industry  the production function of the overall composite
input () is () =  ()1− ()
¡(1− )1−¢, where  is the composite Mexican input and  is
the composite non-member-produced input.
19Condition (9) is well-known in the economic geography literature as the ‘no black hole’ condition, for
example, condition 4.45 on p. 59 of Fujita et al. (1999).
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to () gives a constant markup of 1 , or
() = 

 ∗1−
 , (10)
which implies the total variable profit is (1− ) times the total revenue.
In equilibrium, each firm will receive zero profits on all sales together, but we can say more
than this: Each firm must make zero profits on its domestic sales, and, on the equilibrium
path, must also make zero profits on its exports. This is because in each industry there
will be a subset of firms that choose to serve only the domestic market; they must be
indiﬀerent between entering and not entering, and those that incur the sunk cost to export
will be indiﬀerent between doing so and not doing so. Plugging the value of () into the
profit function and using the zero-profit condition, we can calculate the quantity of variety
 produced for the domestic market in Mexico as
() = 
1−  .
2.6 Equilibrium marginal costs.
Marginal costs for a Mexican manufacturer are a function of the endogenous Mexican wage
and input prices as well as the variety of inputs available. Since a range of those inputs
are produced by those same Mexican manufacturers, Mexican marginal cost is defined by
a recursive relationship. Using equations (6), (7), (8) and  =  for any  ∈ [0 1] in
equilibrium, we obtain
 =   ∗1−
=    (1−) ∗1−
=
µ

−1


¶
 (1−) ∗1−,
where, as before,  is the price of a typical variety. Solving for  and using once again the
fact that the equilibrium mark-up of each variety’s price over marginal cost is equal to 1,
we derive
 =
Ã
 −1

! 
1− ³
 (1−) (∗)1−
´ 1
1−  (11)
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Ceteris paribus, marginal costs for any Mexican firm are lower the more of them there are,
since that expands the variety of inputs available. On the other hand, marginal costs are
higher, the more expensive are the inputs from the non-member country and the higher is
the Mexican wage. The latter has an amplified eﬀect as indicated by the exponent 1
1−
because any factor that raises marginal costs for any one firm by 1%, holding domestic input
prices constant, will cause that firm to raise its price by 1%; but this will happen to all firms
at the same time, so that every domestic input price will rise. Consequently, marginal costs
will rise by more than 1%. The multiplier 1
1− is increasing in the strength of linkages,
and is closely related to what Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015) call the ‘average output
multiplier,’ which they measure for a wide range of countries. They show that it is strongly
correlated with a country’s level of development, a fact that will be useful to keep in mind
in interpreting results later and to which we will return in the Conclusion.
To put this magnification eﬀect into sharper relief, note that a 1% rise in the wage will
directly increase any one firm’s marginal cost by (1−)%  1%, but the magnification eﬀect
results in a larger increase, taking a limit of unity as  → 1. Indeed, if  is close enough to
1 and  is close enough to , the marginal cost will be proportional to ∗ .
It should be noted that equilibrium in a model of this sort is generically ineﬃcient despite
the fact that in simple Dixit-Stiglitz models of monopolistic competition the number of firms
is typically eﬃcient in equilibrium. This is so since the backward and forward linkages in this
model create a positive externality from entry; it lowers marginal cost for all firms, as can be
seen from equation (11). Nevertheless, in making its entry decision, a firm does not take into
account this productivity benefit it confers on all other firms. This is the core market failure
behind the multiple equilibria in Krugman and Venables (1995), for example. Later, we
will see (Proposition 3) that if the linkages are strong enough, a policy that forces Mexican
manufacturers to buy more domestic inputs can even raise Mexican welfare, because it helps
to correct this market failure.
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2.7 Trade policy: Tariﬀs and Rules of Origin.
There is an ad-valorem tariﬀ of  on all imports into the US, and a corresponding tariﬀ
of  ∗ on imports into Mexico. We take these Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariﬀs as exoge-
nous (having been determined by prior multilateral negotiations, for example). They are
accompanied by ROO, which we specify here.
In practice, rules of origin can take several forms. One important category is the change-
of-classification form, which requires that items imported by a member country reside in
a diﬀerent classification of the tariﬀ schedule from the exported finished good in order for
that finished good to be eligible for duty-free treatment. A second important category is the
value-content form, which requires that the share of value produced in the member country
be at least as high as a minimum stated share. Various other types of ROO impose particular
technical criteria. Krishna (2006) and Falvey and Reed (1998) explain these types in detail,
and Conconi et al. (2018) provides a detailed example of a change-of-classification ROO in
NAFTA. For most purposes of economic analysis, the diﬀerence is not important. Conconi et
al. (2018) point out that NAFTA has both types of ROO, with the first type most common,
but in other trade agreements the value-content type is rather more common. Here, for
analytical convenience, we will model all ROO’s as taking the value-content form.
Under a free-trade agreement between the US and Mexico, then, if a rule of origin is
imposed on an industry , then there is a fraction, say , such that a Mexican good is
not eligible for duty-free entry into the US unless at least  of the costs of producing it
are North-American in origin. This is a requirement that the firm’s spending on labor and
Mexican-made inputs for producing the export must be at least  times the total costs
incurred in producing the export. If the ROO is satisfied, the product can then be sold in
the US without tariﬀ, but the manufacturer also has the option of ignoring the ROO and
paying the tariﬀ instead. Accordingly, we will denote the former as  and the latter as
, where the superscripts  and  stand for ‘satisfy’ and ‘not satisfy’, respectively.
Three assumptions should be clarified here, which make the analysis much simpler than
it would be in their absence. First, we assume that a firm can satisfy the ROO by ensuring
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a high domestic content share on its exports alone; production for the Mexican market need
not enter into the calculation. Second, we assume that production for the US market under
an ROO does not require setting up a separate plant and incurring the fixed production cost
 again. These two assumptions together might be called a ‘velvet rope’ assumption: A
firm can separate out, within one production facility, production for export from production
for domestic sale, keeping track of paperwork recording input and labor use so that it can
document that the ROO is satisfied on the former without imposing it on the latter.
Third, we assume that for the purposes of the ROO an input produced by a Mexican
firm with Mexican labor counts as Mexican cost for production of a good for sale in the US,
even if that input itself does not satisfy the ROO. For example, Levent’s Sunshine Toaster
Company in Monterrey, Mexico, which wants to sell toasters in the US market, can satisfy its
ROO partly by buying Mexican-produced heating coils, even if those heating coils themselves
do not satisfy an ROO.
3 The Case of Fast-Track Authority.
We first analyze equilibrium, taking policy as given, under the assumption that Congress
has voted Fast-Track Authority. What that implies is that the President is able to commit
credibly to a trade policy in period 1, subject only to the constraint that it will be welfare-
worsening for neither country. This means, in particular, that Mexican firms will observe
the announced trade policy when they make their decisions as to whether to enter or not
and also whether to invest in quality upgrading for the US market or not. This analysis will
occupy this and the subsequent two sections; we will turn to the case without Fast-Track
Authority in Section 6.
3.1 The Cost of an ROO.
If a Mexican firm is allowed to minimize costs taking prices as given without constraints, it
will produce with a share of North American costs equal to 1− (1− ), since 1−  is the
share of Mexican labor in costs and  is the share of Mexican-produced inputs in costs.
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Suppose that the firm’s industry is faced with an ROO that requires firms to maintain
a North American share of costs at least equal to  in order to export to the US without
paying a tariﬀ. Then if  ≤ 1−(1−), the firm satisfies the ROO even with unconstrained
cost minimization, and so if it chooses to export, it will export duty-free to the US.
Now, suppose that 1 − (1 − )  . Now, the firm cannot satisfy the ROO without
incurring some additional cost to raise the North American share of its costs. Note that if
the firm chooses to satisfy the ROO, it will do so in the lowest-cost manner possible. This
will require that it maintain the right mix of local labor and locally-produced inputs to
keep their marginal rate of substitution equal to the relative price. Given the production
functions, this can be achieved by increasing the labor and local inputs per unit of output
by the same proportion.
Suppose that a firm initially not facing an ROO is producing one unit of output, but then
to satisfy the ROO increases labor input and Mexican-produced inputs per unit of output
by the factor   1. This on its own increases output by (1−(1−)). To reduce output back
down to one unit, it then multiplies its rest-of-world input used by a factor −(1−(1−))(1−)  1.
Write the unit demand for Mexican composite input, rest-of-world input, and labor in the
unconstrained cost minimization respectively as  ,  , and . Then the North American
cost share following the adjustment in inputs is
 + ∗
 + −(1−(1−))(1−)  + ∗
=
1− (1− )
1− (1− ) + (1− ) −1(1−) .
Setting this equal to  and solving for  yields
 −1(1−) = (1− )(1− (1− ))(1− ) .
If we denote the unconstrained minimized unit cost as  and the minimized unit cost subject
to the ROO as  , then substituting the expression for  into unit costs20 yields
(  ) ≡ 

 =
µ
1− (1− )

¶1−(1−)µ(1− )
1− 
¶(1−)
, (12)
20The derivation follows from noting that  =  + −(1−(1−))(1−)  + ∗ =h
+ (1− )−(1−(1−))(1−) + (1− )
i
.
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where (  ) is the compliance cost ratio. This takes a value of 1 at  = 1− (1− )
and increases as  increases above that value, becoming unbounded as  approaches unity.
3.2 Comparison between satisfying and not satisfying an ROO
Now, for a Mexican firm that intends to export its product to the US we consider the decision
of whether or not to satisfy its industry’s ROO. The export profit of a firm  that chooses
to satisfy the ROO ( option) is given by21
 () =
³
()− 
´
()− ,
where () represents the FOB price for the firm, () is the quantity exported, and 
is the fixed cost of exporting (recall that  is denominated in units of output). Note that
the same logic that was used to derive (10) will apply, so the exporters will price with a fixed
markup of 1 over marginal cost. Now, suppose that  is set at a level such that it is optimal
for firms to comply with the ROO. Then using equation (5) and the zero profit condition,
we can rewrite profits as
µ
1− 

¶

⎛
⎝


 
⎞
⎠
1
−1
(1− ) − 
so in equilibrium Ã


! −1
(1− ) (1− ) = .
Similarly, we can also write the profit of a firm  that ignores the ROO and pays the
MFN tariﬀ ( option) as
 () = (()− ) ()− .
Following steps parallel to those above, if  is set so that it is optimal for firms to ignore the
ROO, minimize costs, and pay the tariﬀ, profits become22
21Recall that exporters still make zero profit on their domestic sales.
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µ
1− 

¶

Ã
(1+)

 
! 1−1
(1− ) − 
so in equilibrium µ 

¶ −1
(1 + ) 1−1 (1− ) (1− ) = .
If  is set so that in equilibrium firms in this industry are indiﬀerent between the 
and  options, both conditions must hold at the same time, implyingÃ


! −1 µ
1
1 + 
¶ 1−1
=

 , or
(  ) = 1 +  .
Therefore, any industry whose  parameter is set so that (  )  1 +  will comply
with the ROO, whereas the ones with (  )  1 +  will pay the tariﬀ. If we define
¯ as the value of  such that (  ) = 1 +  and  ≡ 1− (1− ) then the following
holds.23
Proposition 1 If  ≤ , then all exporting firms in industry  will source inputs to min-
imize cost; the ROO will not bind; and they will export to the US without paying tariﬀ. If
   ≤ ¯, then all exporting firms in industry  will source inputs to satisfy the ROO
exactly for their export operation; the ROO binds; and they will export to the US without
paying tariﬀ. If   ¯, then all exporting firms in industry  will source inputs to minimize
cost, ignoring the ROO; and they will export to the US and pay the MFN tariﬀ.24
This summarizes the firm’s decision on whether or not to comply with an ROO: It will
ignore a very low or very high ROO, but comply with an intermediate ROO, raising its costs
as it does so, but avoiding the tariﬀ.
22Note that when calculating a Mexican firm’s profit, the price () represents the price the Mexican firm
receives. On the other hand, the quantity, () is a function of the price the U.S. consumers pay. Under
 option, the U.S. consumers pay (1 + )().
23This may seem like more work than is necessary; since the tariﬀ is isomorphic from the firm’s point of
view to an increase in marginal cost, surely it is automatic that it will pay the tariﬀ unless the increase in
marginal cost due to the ROO exceeds 1+ ? The reason this is insuﬃcient logic is that the ROO raises the
cost of both the variable and the fixed cost, while the tariﬀ applies only to the variable cost.
24Note that  = ¯ is a knife-edge case in which exporting firms in industry  are indiﬀerent between
satisfying the ROO and ignoring it. We break the tie by assuming that they will satisfy the ROO.
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Some readers may wonder if non-compliance with ROO’s is of more than theoretical
interest, but in fact it is extremely common. In 2002, 45% of US imports from Canada failed
to comply with ROO’s and paid MFN tariﬀs; the corresponding figure for Mexico is 37%.
Compliance rates also varied greatly across industries; in the same year 95% of textile and
apparel imports from Canada were in compliance, compared with 14% for jewelry (Kunimoto
and Sawchuk, 2005, p. 14). Anson et al. (2005) study patterns in non-compliance in intra-
NAFTA trade. Hakobyan (2015) studies non-compliance with ROO’s for developing-country
tariﬀ preferences in US imports.
In contrast to Proposition 1, in some models, once the restrictiveness of an ROO is
increased past the point at which firms no longer prefer to comply, the equilibrium switches
to a mixed outcome in which some firms comply and some do not. This occurs because the
locally-produced input used for that particular final good drops in price just enough that
the firms are indiﬀerent between complying with the ROO and paying the tariﬀ. Examples
include Grossman (1981) and Ju and Krishna (2005), both models in which one final good
is produced with one input that is used only for that one final good. However, that cannot
happen in a general equilibrium model in which the ROO applies to one industry out of a
large number, each of which is small in the broad market for manufactured inputs, such as
ours.
3.3 National incomes as function of trade policy.
First, we analyze the equilibrium under a free trade agreement. Let  denote the number
of industries hit with an ROO who choose not to comply with it. Each firm in each of these
industries will choose to pay the tariﬀ  when exporting to the US. Let national income in
the US, which in this model amounts to GDP plus any tariﬀ revenue, be denoted by  , and
let national income in Mexico be denoted  ∗.
Of course, an industry not subject to an ROO or subject to an ROO and complying
with it generates no tariﬀ revenue. On the other hand, for an industry  facing an ROO
but not complying, US consumer spending on the industry is (1− ) , but only (1−)
1+ of
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that spending reaches the Mexican producers. Consequently, the tariﬀ revenue generated by
each non-compliant ROO industry is equal to (1−)
1+ and so total tariﬀ revenue is given by
multiplying this value by . Hence, national income can be written as
 = +(1− )
1 +  ,
where  is US GDP (the wage, equal to unity, times the labor supply) plus tariﬀ revenue.
Simplifying, this yields
 =
µ
1 + 
1 + (1−(1− )) 
¶
. (13)
Note that this is always greater than the GDP, , unless the tariﬀ is equal to zero or  = 0,
so that no Mexican industry pays the tariﬀ. (The case in which where is no trade agreement
in force can be represented conveniently by setting  = 1, so that all Mexican imports to
the US are subject to tariﬀ.)
Mexican income can be derived in a similar way. First we note that
 ∗ = ∗∗ +Π∗ + ∗,
where ∗ is the Mexican wage, ∗ is the supply of labor in Mexico, Π∗ is aggregate profits in
Mexico, and ∗ is tariﬀ revenue in Mexico. In equilibrium, Π∗ = 0, but to analyze the case
without FT we will need to be able to compute income oﬀ of the equilibrium path, so that
the trade policy expected by entrepreneurs is diﬀerent from what is finally implemented, and
in that case we can have non-zero profits. By an argument parallel to that used to derive
(13), we can write
 ∗ =
µ
1 +  ∗
1 + (1− ) ∗
¶
(∗∗ +Π∗) , (14)
where  ∗ is the Mexican tariﬀ and  is a dummy variable for MFN tariﬀ that takes a value
of 1 if there is no free trade agreement in force, so that all US imports are subject to the
tariﬀ  ∗, and 0 if a free trade agreement is in force, so that US imports enter the country
duty-free. Once again, note that because of tariﬀ revenue, Mexican income strictly exceeds
Mexican GDP, ∗∗ + Π∗, unless the Mexican tariﬀ has a value of zero or there is a free
trade agreement in force.
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3.4 A key proposition on optimal ROO policy.
Some basic comparative statics regarding the eﬀects of ROO’s can now be derived.
Proposition 2 Suppose that FT is in eﬀect, so that both  and the number of Mexican
firms that export will adjust to any announced choice of policy to make profits in Mexican
manufacturing zero, i.e., Π∗ = 0.25 Suppose that the rules of origin {} for  ∈ [0 1] have
been set so that a fraction  of the industries have   ¯ (and thus ignore the ROO and
pay the tariﬀ); a fraction (1 − )(1 − ) have  ≤  (and thus for them the ROO is not
binding); and a fraction (1−) have    ≤ ¯ (and thus comply with the ROO). Denote
the average value of  for the complying industries by . Now consider changing the ROO
schedule so that  changes but not  or . Then
∗
  0

  0, and

  0,
where  is the total imports of composite non-member inputs.
Proof. See appendix.
If complying firms are made to increase their purchases of Mexican inputs and labor,
that increases the demand for Mexican labor, raising the Mexican wage; raises the demand
for Mexican inputs, increasing the number of inputs produced; and lowers the import of
non-member inputs. Now, note that the tightening of ROO’s increases ∗, which tends to
raise the marginal cost of Mexican manufacturers, while it also raises , which, recalling
(11), tends to have the opposite eﬀect. The net eﬀect on Mexican costs is ambiguous, and
depends on the following condition.
Proposition 3 Denoting by  the marginal cost of a Mexican firm for the domestic market
(and thus the marginal cost for exports in the case of an exporting firm that is not constrained
by an ROO),

  0 iﬀ
25When FT is not in eﬀect, the number of exporters cannot adjust following an amendment by the U.S.
Congress. In that case, the number of firms in Mexico, , will adjust to guarantee zero profit only for firms
serving the domestic market, not for exporters. We will comment on this case without FT in Section 6.1.
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   (1− )
1−  . (15)
This condition is ensured by (9).
Proof. See appendix.
The stronger are backward and forward linkages, or in other words the bigger is , the
more likely it is that the eﬀect of the ROO on the number of Mexican firms dominates for
marginal costs. It is immediate as well that if (15) holds, the number of varieties of each
industry exported to the US is also decreasing in .26 This all brings us to a very important
conclusion on policy.
Proposition 4 If (15) is satisfied, it is never optimal from the point of view of US welfare
for a positive mass of industries to have ROO’s with    ≤ ¯.
The point is that if condition (15) is satisfied, when  is in the middle range, it raises
the cost of producing Mexico’s exports to the US, raising their prices to US consumers and
lowering the variety of products available to US consumers, but does not generate any tariﬀ
revenue. From here on, we will assume condition (15) holds unless otherwise stated, and
therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that for each ,  is either above ¯ (it
makes no diﬀerence how far above) or below  (it makes no diﬀerence how far below). For
brevity, henceforth we will call the former the case of an ‘ROO,’ and the latter the case of
‘no ROO.’27
It is worth underlining the ineﬃciency of equilibrium implied by Proposition 3. Note that
for any firm complying with its ROO, the marginal cost will be equal to  times (  ),
and from (12) the elasticity of (  ) with respect to  is equal to 0 if  = . This
together with Proposition 3 imply that if backward and forward linkages were strong enough
26Consider an industry  in which firms comply with the ROO. US spending on this industry is equal to
(1 − ) , and variable profits will equal (1− ) (1 − ) . From (13), this is unchanged by a change in .
For zero profits to hold, the aggregate sunk cost ˜ incurred in industry , where ˜ is the number
of firms in the industry that upgrade their quality for export, must be equal to total variable profit. Since
an increase in  raises  , it must lower ˜. The argument for other industries is parallel.
27It is obvious that the trivial case  =  is also under ROO.
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that condition (15) was not satisfied, then Mexican firms’ costs would be reduced if they
were all forced to deviate from cost-minimizing behavior by an ROO that makes them buy
more Mexican inputs than they would choose on their own — including (at least for small
increases of  above ) the firms that are complying with the ROO. The reason is that it
spurs additional firm creation, which is possible without any additional resources because
the additional firms raise the productivity of all Mexican firms. Given condition (9), that
extreme case will not occur in the part of the parameter space that concerns us, but the
ineﬃciency that is highlighted by the extreme case — too few Mexican firms in equilibrium
— will still always be present in a less extreme form.
Beyond our model, there are cases in which binding ROO’s could be optimal from the
point of view of the US. Falvey and Reed (2002) study a model in which an ROO imposed
by an importing country can lower exporters’ marginal costs, for example, by lowering the
price of inputs from third countries. In our model, this could happen if Mexico had a
strong eﬀect on factor prices in non-member countries, so that a shift in input demand away
from non-member countries lowers the price of inputs purchased from those countries. In
addition, if the US produced inputs that compete with Mexican imports, the ROO could
confer a terms-of-trade benefit to the US by increased within-NAFTA demand for those
inputs. This mechanism is at play in Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007). In addition, if
firms were heterogenous in their compliance costs it is likely that any equilibrium would
have a mix of compliant and non-compliant firms in each industry. In our model, the simple
structure of optimal ROO’s that emerges makes the potential use of ROO’s as protectionist
devices clear in a stark manner. GATT Article XXIV is generally read to require that a free-
trade agreement specify no tariﬀs at all on trade between members. In our model, however,
ROO’s eﬀectively function as a way of selectively turning oﬀ tariﬀ preferences for a subset
of industries that is consistent with the letter if not the spirit of Article XXIV, and so our
ROO’s fit into the category termed ‘hidden protection’ in Krishna and Krueger (1995). This
does seem to be an important function of ROO’s in practice, as indicated by the percentage
of intra-NAFTA trade that is subject to tariﬀs as discussed in Section 3.2.
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3.5 Equilibrium wage in Mexico.
We consider market-clearing conditions for the US numeraire good. Recall that under our
assumptions this is produced only in the US, but it is consumed everywhere. Its supply is
of course equal to the US labor supply, , which, since it is the numeraire good, is both the
quantity produced and the value sold. Domestic US consumer spending on the numeraire
good is  . Mexican consumer spending on the numeraire good is  ∗, of which  ∗
1+∗ is
the value received by US producers (recall that  is the dummy for MFN tariﬀ, as in Section
3.3).
To arrive at the demand from the non-member country we need a slightly roundabout
argument. Suppose that in the aggregate, a quantity  of input is imported to Mexico
from the non-member country at the constant world price of  . Then Mexico will have
a trade deficit with the non-member country amounting to  . Since each country’s
trade must be balanced overall in equilibrium, Mexico must run a trade surplus with the
US exactly equal to this amount, and since US trade must also be balanced overall, the US
runs an equal-sized trade surplus with the non-member country. Therefore, US sales of its
numeraire good to the non-member country must be equal in equilibrium to  .
As a result, market clearing for the numeraire good can be written as
 =  + 
∗
1 +  ∗ +  . (16)
Since cost minimization by Mexican firms implies that labor’s share of total production costs
is equal to 1−  and non-member inputs’ share is equal to (1− ), and in the aggregate,
labor’s share of costs must be equal to ∗∗, the condition can be rewritten as
 =  + 
∗
1 +  ∗ +
(1− )
1−  
∗∗.
Using (13) and (14), we obtain
∗ =
∙
(1− )(1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¸
() ∗ , (17)
where
() ≡ 1 + (1−)
1 + (1−(1− )) . (18)
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Note that the Mexican wage ∗ is decreasing in  and ∗, since these parameters respec-
tively shift relative demand toward US-made goods, away from Mexican-produced goods,
and increase the relative supply of Mexican labor. For our discussion, there are two rele-
vant policy variables,  and  (since we are taking the existing tariﬀ rates as given, but
governments in the course of negotiation can choose the coverage of ROO’s and whether
or not to walk away from the free-trade agreement). Therefore, we can use (17) to define
the equilibrium Mexican wage as a function of these two variables, ∗( ). It is easy to
verify that this function is decreasing in  and increasing in . An increase in  causes a
wider range of Mexican industries to be subject to US tariﬀs, which switches US consumer
demand away from Mexican-produced goods. Switching  from 0 to 1 amounts to tearing
up the free-trade agreement, which causes the Mexican tariﬀ to be in force on all imports
from the US. This pushes down the relative price of the numeraire good relative to Mexican
products, raising the Mexican wage ∗ relative to the US wage, and providing Mexico with
a terms-of-trade benefit.
Proposition 5 The Mexican wage in terms of the numeraire, ∗, is decreasing in the num-
ber  of industries hit by rules of origin and is also decreased if Mexico eliminates its tariﬀ
(switching  from 1 to 0).
3.6 Equilibrium number of firms.
Consider first the equilibrium number of domestic firms in Mexico. In order to find this,
we need to add up the total domestic Mexican demand for a typical industry . This
consists of (a) Mexican final consumer demand; (b) demand by Mexican firms for inputs to
produce output for export; and (c) inputs required for (a) and (b) plus inputs to produce
inputs. Domestic consumer demand is equal to (1 − ) ∗. Total revenues from exports,
and therefore total costs for export production, amount to (1− ) for a no-ROO industry
and (1−)
(1+) for an ROO industry. Given that there are (1− ) of the former and  of the
latter industries, export revenues are equal to (1−)
³
1+(1−)
1+
´
 , and a fraction  of that
amount goes to domestically-produced inputs to produce those exports. We can therefore
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write parts (a) and (b) above as  + ≡ (1 − )
³
 ∗ + 
³
1+(1−)
1+
´

´
. If we denote
revenue from production of intermediates, part (c) above, by  , then domestic revenue for
all Mexican firms together is  ++ , and since all Mexican firms produce with a cost share
of domestic intermediates equal to , we have   = ( + +  ), so   =
³ 
1−
´
 +,
and the domestic revenue of all Mexican firms is equal to  +(1 − ). Total revenues
times (1− ) yields variable profit (recall Section 2.5), so equating variable profit with fixed
costs implies
(∗) = (1− ) 1− 
1− 
∙
 ∗ + 
µ
1 + (1−)
1 + 
¶

¸
, so
 = (1− )(1− )
(1− )(∗)
∙
 ∗(∗ ) +
µ
1 + (1−)
1 + 
¶

¸
.
In other words,  is proportional to the domestic demand for Mexican products and inversely
proportional to the fixed cost (∗).28 Using (13), (14), and (17), this can be rewritten
as
 =
∙
(1− )(1− )(1 +  ∗) + (1 + (1− ) ∗)
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¸
(1− )(1− )
(∗) (). (19)
From (11), the right-hand side of (19) is increasing in , taking a limit of 0 as  → 0.
Further, the elasticity of the right-hand side with respect to  is equal toµ
1− 

¶µ 
1− 
¶
.
The value of this elasticity must be less than 1 for the stability of the equilibrium, which
requires
  . (20)
Clearly, condition (9) guarantees this, so (20) will be redundant.
28It is tempting to see the Mexican economy as a version of a Krugman (1980) economy, with one
monopolistically-competitive sector that produces with labor as the only non-produced input, so that the
constant markup implies a constant size for each firm, in turn implying a constant number of firms pinned
down by the size of the Mexican labor force. This is not how the model works, for two reasons. First, some
of the  Mexican firms choose to export, which requires additional labor, and the number of firms that do
so is endogenous. Second, all of these firms use imported inputs, and a rise in ∗ induces substitution away
from Mexican labor toward imported inputs, reducing the labor required by each firm.
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We can now identify the main comparative statics results with respect to a change in the
ROO policy. It will be useful to focus on elasticities, and we denote by  the elasticity of
variable  with respect to the variable . Nothing in the big square brackets of (19) depends
on  either directly or indirectly, so in computing the elasticity  of  with respect to 
under FT, we need only to focus on the fraction at the end of the expression. Given (11),
this amounts to
 =  −
µ− 1

¶µ 
1− 
¶
 −
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗,
which from (17) is the same as
 =  −
µ− 1

¶µ 
1− 
¶
 −
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
.
Solving this, we have the elasticity of the number of firms in Mexico with respect to the
extent of the rules of origin
 = (1− )−    0, (21)
since (9) is assumed and using (18)
 = − (1 + )[1 + (1−(1− )) ][1 + (1−) ]  0. (22)
Therefore, if  is increased, the number of firms in Mexico goes down. The exception is if
 = 0 or  = 1, the two cases in which there are no imported inputs used. In both of these
cases, units costs are proportional to ∗ (see (11)), which is proportional to the demand
shifter () (see (17)), so when  is increased costs fall in proportion with demand, and the
number of firms is unchanged.29 Otherwise, the fall in  resulting from an increase in  will
tend to raise marginal costs for Mexican firms (recall (11) again), while at the same time,
from (17), the increase in  lowers the Mexican wage ∗, which tends to lower Mexican
marginal costs. The net eﬀect on marginal costs in Mexico is ambiguous, and given by
 =
µ− 1

¶µ 
1− 
¶
 +
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗,
29The neutrality of  to  when  = 0 or  = 1 can also be seen from (19). When unit costs are
proportional to ∗, the demand shifter () cancels out and  does not depend on  anymore.
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which, given (21) and (17), yields
 =
µ(1− (1− ))− 
− 
¶
. (23)
Given (20) and   0 as shown in (22), this means that an increase in  lowers , and
therefore the price of each good produced in Mexico, as long as the numerator is positive.
This will be true if  is small enough; specifically,
  0⇔  
µ 
1− 
¶µ
1− 

¶
. (24)
Note that this is the same condition given in (15), and just as before it is guaranteed to hold
by (9).
We turn now to the number of firms in each Mexican industry that choose to export to
the US. For a given industry , US consumer spending on the industry’s products together
is equal to (1−) . If industry  is not subject to an ROO (no-ROO industry), this is also
the amount Mexican producers obtain whereas if it is subject to an ROO, only (1−)
1+ of that
spending reaches Mexican producers. Each firm produces 
1− units of exported output. In
order for the total industry export revenues to be equal to the value of consumer spending
on the products received by Mexican producers, we must have
˜ 
µ 
1− 
¶
 = (1− ) , if  is a no-ROO industry
˜ 
µ 
1− 
¶
 = (1− )
1 +  , if  is an ROO industry,
where ˜ and ˜ denote the number of -industry firms that choose to export in a no-
ROO and ROO industry, respectively. This yields the equilibrium number of exporters for
a typical no-ROO industry
˜ = (1− )(1− )  . (25)
For an industry subject to an ROO, since they receive only 1(1 + ) of the consumer
spending, their equilibrium number is reduced accordingly
˜ = ˜

1 +  . (26)
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The total number of exporters ˜ is defined as
˜ = ˜ + (1−)˜. (27)
It is straightforward to derive that if Mexican firms correctly anticipate the ROO policy that
will be followed, then a more restrictive ROO policy will result in fewer exporters.
Proposition 6 The total number of exporting firms in Mexico, ˜, is decreasing in  in
equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
4 Welfare.
Welfare in Mexico can be computed from the indirect utility function, derived from (1)
 = 
∗
(1 +  ∗)
³
 −1 
´1− . (28)
Proposition 7 Under condition (24), a fully anticipated increase in  will lower the Mexi-
can wage, the number of varieties produced in each Mexican industry, and Mexican welfare.
Proof. Proposition 5 shows that an increase in  will lower the Mexican wage in terms of
the numeraire, and under the stated assumptions it will also lower  as can be seen from
(21). Using (14), (28) can be written asµ
(1 +  ∗)∗
1 + (1− ) ∗
¶ ∗
(1 +  ∗)
³
−1 (∗)
´1− .
The first factor in this expression does not depend on  or ∗. Since, from (11), the function
(∗) is decreasing in  and increasing in ∗ with an elasticity less than one, the second
factor is increasing in both  and ∗. ¥
The corresponding expression for US welfare requires computation of the consumer price
index in the US. Suppose that industries expect an ROO. The price index for the composite
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good for each of those industries (see (7)) is  = ¡˜¢−1 (1+). The other 1− industries
are not subject to an ROO. The price index for each of those industries’ composite goods in
the US is  = ¡˜¢ −1 .
Consequently, the log of the price in the US of composite imported goods from Mexico is
ln( ) = R 1
0
ln() = (1−) ln
³¡˜¢−1 ´+ ln³¡˜¢−1 (1 + )´, so (recalling that
˜ = ˜(1 + )),
 = (1 + ) ¡˜¢−1 . (29)
Consequently, using (1) and (29), US welfare is given by
 = ³
(1 + ) (˜) −1 
´1− . (30)
Holding fixed the price of each Mexican good, US welfare is reduced by a rise in the tariﬀ
or by the number  of industries that pay the tariﬀ (since this increases the consumption
distortion), and increases with a rise in the number of varieties exported to the US (recalling
that from (25), (26), and (27) the total number of exported varieties is proportional to ˜).
We can now clarify the need for condition (9). In the case with no trade agreement at
all (equivalent to the case of  = 1), a positive tariﬀ  is desirable for the US if and only if
(9) holds:
Proposition 8 With  = 1, the tariﬀ  that maximizes US welfare is positive if and only
if   .
Throughout our analysis, we assume that tariﬀs are positive, which would be diﬃcult
to justify if a unilateral tariﬀ elimination would raise welfare. Proposition 8 shows that
condition (9) eliminates this case. The underlying reason is as follows. Increasing the US
tariﬀ pushes down the US demand for Mexican products, which puts downward pressure both
on the Mexican wage and on the number of Mexican firms. The former eﬀect is desirable
for the US, because it improves the US terms of trade, but the latter eﬀect is undesirable
because it raises costs for Mexican firms, increasing their prices and worsening the US terms
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of trade. The eﬀect on the number of firms is larger the larger is ,30 and the eﬀect of
reduced product variety on Mexican costs is larger, the smaller is .31 Condition (9) ensures
that the eﬀect on the Mexican wage is the dominant factor from the point of view of US
welfare.
5 Equilibrium with Fast-Track Authority.
To compute US welfare under a given value of  under FT, combine (30) with (25) and the
condition that  =  to obtain
 =
"
(1 + )
µ
(1− )(1− )

¶−1 #−(1−)  1−(1−) − (1−) . (31)
US negotiators choose  to maximize US welfare, taking into account the eﬀect of  on
all endogenous variables (, ˜, ˜, ∗, and ), subject to the constraint that Mexican
welfare with the agreement is not less than Mexican welfare without it. This amounts to
 ©( 0)ª 3 ( 0) ≥ (1 1),
where ( ) and ( ) denote respectively US and Mexican utility, taking full
account of the equilibrium eﬀect of  and  on all endogenous variables. As before,  is a
dummy variable that records a value of 1 if no free-trade agreement is in force, so that the
tariﬀs apply to all trade between the US and Mexico; and  records a value of 0 if a free-trade
agreement is in force, so that the tariﬀ applies only to ROO sectors exporting to the US
from Mexico. Of course, if there is no free-trade agreement in eﬀect, all industries will pay
the tariﬀ, which is equivalent to setting  = 1, and so the welfare constraint is written as
(1 1). There are two cases: the case in which the constraint on Mexican welfare does
30Recall from Section 3.6 that the number of Mexican firms is proportional to the demand for Mexican
products and inversely proportional to the fixed cost  per firm. If  = 0, the cost is simply proportional
to the wage ∗, but the wage is also proportional to the demand for Mexican products, so the net eﬀect on
 is zero. If   0, the cost is less sensitive to the wage, and this allows for the number of firms to respond
to the tariﬀ.
31If  is close to 1, products are almost perfect substitutes, and product variety does not much matter.
Recall (11).
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not bind, which we may call the ‘interior solution,’ and the case in which it does bind, which
we may call the ‘corner solution.’
5.1 Case I: The Interior Solution.
From (31), the elasticity of US welfare with respect to  under FT can be written as
  = −1−   log(1 + ) +
1− (1− )
  −
1− 
 . (32)
From (13), we have
 = (1− )1 + (1−(1− )) . (33)
Furthermore, since markups are constant, we have  = . Combining (32) with (23),
(22), and (33), we obtain the following
  = (1−)
h

1+(1−(1−))
³
1−  (1− ) + (1+)([1−(1−)]−)
[1+(1−) ][−]
´
− log (1 + )
i
.
(34)
The expression in the square brackets is increasing in . Therefore, if (34) is ever equal to
zero, say for some value  = ˆ, then for all   ˆ, it is negative, and for all   ˆ, it is
positive. Therefore, ˆ is a minimum for US welfare rather than a maximum, and the only
possible unconstrained optimal values for  are 0 or 1. In addition, if  is bounded above
by an incentive constraint, so that it cannot take a value above, say, , then the only
possible optimal values are 0 and . Therefore, we can disregard the interior solution
and focus entirely on the corner solution.
5.2 Case II: The Corner Solution.
We can use (34) to clarify which corner solution will be preferred. The relationship between
 and  is crucial, which makes sense because the higher is , the more important are
intermediate inputs in production, and the lower is , the more important is the variety of
intermediate inputs in production, so for high  and low  the reduction in  caused by
expansion of ROO’s discourages the US from using them aggressively. Precisely:
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Proposition 9 For suﬃciently small   0, US welfare under FT is increasing in  if
   and decreasing in  if   .
Proof. See appendix.
Therefore, at least in the small- case, if   , the optimum will be  = 0 and if
   — as we assume throughout — it will be the highest  that satisfies the Mexican
participation constraint. In the latter case, the negotiations set the value of  so that the
Mexican government will be indiﬀerent between tearing up the agreement and ratifying it.
In this case, the optimal value of , say, ∗, will satisfy
(∗  = 0) = ( = 1  = 1). (35)
Comment. The contrast between optimal ROO policy and the familiar analysis of op-
timal tariﬀ setting is clearly quite stark. Optimal tariﬀ setting, whether in the sense of
maximizing social welfare or some political support function, typically involves an interior
solution, satisfying a first-order condition that balances oﬀ terms-of-trade benefits and pos-
sibly domestic redistribution eﬀects against domestic distortions created by the tariﬀ (for a
survey, see McLaren, 2016). However, we have seen here that in the present context, where
ROO’s are the instrument of protection an interior solution is never optimal. The reason is
as follows. Each expansion of the use of ROO’s (each increase in ) increases the number
of industries in Mexico that pay the tariﬀ, yielding a terms-of-trade benefit to the US. An
additional benefit is that the rise in the price of imports for consumers in the newly-ROO-
constrained industries shifts some consumer spending toward industries that are already
constrained by an ROO. This undoes a portion of the consumer distortion of the tariﬀ (be-
cause the tariﬀ ineﬃciently discourages consumption of imports from those industries). This
particular marginal benefit increases with increases in ROO coverage , because the more
ROO-aﬀected industries there are, the more industries have tariﬀ-distorted consumption. As
a consequence, an important portion of the marginal benefit from expanding ROO coverage
rises with expanding ROO coverage. There is no analogous rising marginal benefit to tariﬀ
level in an optimal-tariﬀ calculation.
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6 The Case without Fast Track.
All of the preceding analysis has been based on the assumption that Fast Track is in force,
so that the value of  proposed in the agreement in period 1 is the same as the value that
prevails in period 2. Now, consider the case in which FT is not in eﬀect, so it is possible for
Congress to alter the agreement in period 2, just before ratification, after businesses have
made their decisions in period 1. For our purposes, that means that in period 2, the value
of ˜, the number of firms in industry  that have made the sunk investment in quality
required to export to the US, is taken as given, and cannot respond to changes in . Rather,
˜ responds to the trade policy that was expected, as of period 1, to prevail in period 2. The
conditions (25), (26), and (27) will still apply, but, for example, ˜ will be the number of
firms that invest in an industry that was not expected to be hit with a protectionist ROO, and
the values on the right-hand side are the anticipated US GDP and the anticipated value of
marginal costs, . We can consequently write all equilibrium variables as functions of realized
trade policy and also of the ˜’s. Most variables of interest will need to be conditioned only
on the aggregate, ˜, and not on ˜ and ˜ separately.
Under these conditions, we can rewrite the definition of constrained-optimal , as defined
in (35) and denoted ∗, as
(∗ ˜(∗)  = 0) = ( = 1 ˜( = 1)  = 1), (36)
where ˜() is the value of ˜ that results when as of period 1 it was expected that  industries
would be hit with ROO’s. By Proposition 6, ˜(∗)  ˜(1) as long as ∗  1.
This optimal value of  will not be credible in the absence of an FT if
(∗ ˜(∗)  = 0)  ( = 1 ˜(∗)  = 1). (37)
The left-hand side of (37) is Mexican welfare if the US promises ∗; this promise is
believed by all market participants; and the US actually implements ∗. (It is the same as
the left-hand side of (35).) The right-hand side of (37) is Mexican welfare if the US promises
∗; this promise is believed by all market participants; and Mexico in the end walks away
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from the agreement, tearing it up so that both countries’ trade policies return to the status-
quo ante ( = 1 and  = 1); but Mexico’s export sector is still locked into the investment
level (˜(∗)) that results from an expectation of ∗. If (37) holds, then ∗ is not credible
ex ante because if it were believed ex ante then ex post Mexico would be strictly worse oﬀ
tearing up the agreement rather than abiding by the agreement; therefore, Congress would
have some leeway to adjust  ex post in a way that would be beneficial to the US and
harmful to Mexico at the margin, and the Mexican government would still have an incentive
to ratify. Since everyone would understand this, then (37) would imply that no-one would
believe the US promise to implement ∗.
Since the left-hand sides of (36) and (37) are the same, for (37) to hold, it is suﬃcient
that
( = 1 ˜( = 1)  = 1)  ( = 1 ˜(∗)  = 1). (38)
If that is true, and it is further true that the US can improve its welfare ex post by
changing the value of  in a way that is injurious to Mexico, then (i) Mexico will do just
as well under a free-trade agreement with Fast Track as under no talks at all; (ii) Mexico
will do strictly worse under a free-trade agreement without Fast Track, because ex post,
Congress can get Mexico to agree to the agreement with a higher value of  than it could
with Fast Track. Therefore, Mexico will never agree to negotiate without Fast Track. We
now investigate these conditions, which require us to learn about the comparative statics
of period 2. To verify whether or not the US will want to adjust  in period 2, we need
to study the comparative statics with respect to , holding ˜ constant. To verify whether
or not (38) holds, we need to study the comparative statics with respect to ˜, holding 
constant. We turn to those inquiries now.
6.1 Ex post labor market clearing without Fast Track.
Without Fast-Track Authority, each business manager in Mexico will need to conjecture
what amendments the US Congress might make to the agreement, and make investments
accordingly. If firm  upgrades its product quality in order to be able to export to the US,
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then its management must start a process of transformation of the productive process in
period 1 that will cost it  units of lost output in period 2 This decision is irreversible; if
the firm’s conjecture turns out in period 2 to be wrong, it will not be able to change it. In
order to focus on the hold-up problem that results from this trade-specific sunk investment,
we assume that firms can enter or exit Mexican manufacturing in period 2 (unless they have
committed themselves to export), responding to new information about the actions of the
US Congress.
One technical issue needs to be mentioned before we proceed: In analyzing the Period-2
outcomes without FT, we will assume that, as in the case with FT, it is not optimal for
the US to issue a binding ROO with which firms in Mexico will comply. We have been
unable to identify a suﬃcient condition analogous to that in Proposition 4. However, we
have performed numerical simulations for a broad range of parameter values and have not
found a case in which it does not hold. Details are available on request. Henceforth, we will
assume implicitly the non-optimality of binding ROO’s in Period 2.
Now on to the analysis of Period-2 equilibrium. A diﬃculty with the analysis without
Fast Track is that although the zero-profit condition must be satisfied in equilibrium, it
need not be satisfied oﬀ of the equilibrium path. Precisely, if Congress chooses a value
of  in period 2 that is diﬀerent from what was anticipated in period 1, the firms that
invested in export capability will generally have non-zero profit. (Firms that do not export
will still have zero profit, since we allow them to enter or exit in period 2, and so  is
still endogenous.) This means that the logic used to derive (17), which repeatedly involves
equating expenditure on an industry’s products with that industry’s cost, cannot be used,
at least not oﬀ the equilibrium path. To analyze labor-market clearing in Mexico in this
situation for an arbitrary value of  and ˜, we compute the costs for each industry as
follows. Let  denote the cost incurred by all manufacturing firms across Mexico. The
variable cost incurred for the production of products exported to the US is denoted  , and
the variable cost of the products sold in Mexico as final consumption goods is denoted .
(The variable cost of a given subset of production is simply the marginal cost, , times the
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number of units produced.) The variable cost of output sold in Mexico as an intermediate
input (whether for production of products for domestic sale or of products for export) is
denoted  . The cost implied by the fixed costs for all firms is  , and the cost implied by
all of the quality upgrades for export is given by ˜.
These definitions imply the adding-up constraint
 =  +  +  +  + ˜. (39)
Note that regardless of the behavior of Congress, Mexican firms will make zero profits on
their domestic sales. (Mexican firms that do not export will make zero profits, and Mexican
firms that do export will charge the same prices and incur the same costs on their domestic
sales as those that do not, and will therefore also make zero domestic profits on their domestic
sales.) This allows us to write
 +  +  = (1− ) ∗ + 

 . (40)
The left-hand side is the total cost incurred on domestic sales, including fixed costs, while
the right hand side is the revenue of domestic firms on all domestic sales: the sum of Mexican
final consumer demand (the first term) and Mexican spending on Mexican-made inputs (the
second term). This last point follows since with price a constant mark-up of 1 over marginal
costs, total expenditure on Mexican inputs is equal to the total variable cost of producing
those inputs divided by , or  . Substituting the right-hand side of this expression into
(39) yields
 = (1− ) ∗ + 

 + 
 + ˜. (41)
Now, given the Cobb-Douglas production function, total spending on domestic inputs
must be equal to  .32 Again, given that each variety’s price is a markup of 1 over
marginal cost, the variable cost of production of domestic inputs,  , must be equal to
 . Substituting this into (41) and solving for  yields
 = (1− )
∗ +  + ˜
1−  . (42)
32Note that this depends on there being no ROO’s to which firms actually comply. For the case with FT,
Proposition 4 established conditions under which that will be the case. For the case without FT, we assume
this is the case based on our numerical simulations.
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Multiplying both sides by the Cobb-Douglas weight on labor in production yields
∗∗ = (1− )
µ
(1− ) ∗ +  + ˜
1− 
¶
. (43)
We can derive  from US income and preferences, recalling that for industries under an
ROO, the expenditure by US consumers is equal to 1 +  times the revenue received by
Mexican firms

 = (1− )
µ 
1 +  + 1−
¶
,
which can be rewritten as
 = (1− )(), (44)
where () is as defined in (18).
We also need an expression for aggregate profits in order to calculate Mexican income
using (14). These are given by revenue minus cost in the export sector. Variable costs
in Mexican manufacturing are equal to  ; recalling that the producer’s price is equal to
marginal cost divided by , we conclude that revenues to the Mexican export sector are equal
to  . Since the sunk cost for the export sector is given by ˜, using (44) we conclude that
Π∗ = 1−  
 − ˜
= (1− )(1− )()− ˜. (45)
Substituting in the expression for  ∗ from (14) and for  and Π∗ just derived into (43),
we have
³
1−
1− − (1−)(1+
∗)
(1+(1−)∗)
´
∗∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
h
1 + (1−)(1+
∗)
1+(1−)∗
1−

i
(1− )()
+
³
1− (1−)(1+∗)
(1+(1−)∗)
´
˜,
(46)
which, after some simplification, becomes
∗∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ
(1− )(1− ) [1 + (1− ) ∗ − (1− )]
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¶
| {z }
Denote by 
()
+
µ (1− )
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¶
| {z }
Denote by 
˜,
(47)
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This is one of two key equilibrium conditions that are needed to determine the eﬀect of
changes in ˜ and  on the endogenous variables. We can think of this as roughly a labor-
market clearing condition, with the left hand indicating the value of labor supplied in Mexico
and the right hand indicating the value of labor demanded, both from foreign demand for
exported Mexican products (and from the induced input demand and Mexican consumer
demand from the Mexican income that those exports generate); and the labor demand from
the pre-committed sunk cost ˜.33 Notice that for a given , increasing ˜ so that ˜ goes
up by one dollar implies that ∗∗ goes up by less than a dollar (since   1) — and so
in that case Mexican income, which is given in (14) as the sum of wage income and profits
(multiplied by a positive coeﬃcient to take into account any tariﬀ revenue), falls.
We can combine (47) with (45) to obtain a compact expression for Mexican income
∗∗ +Π∗ = [1 + (1− ) ∗]
³
[(1−)+(1−)(1−)](1−)()−(1−)˜(∗)
(1−)+(1−)(1+(1−)∗)
´
. (48)
6.2 Determination of n.
Total cost incurred by Mexican firms on their domestic sales (including fixed costs) are given
by (40). Using  =  and (42), (40) becomes
 +  +  = (1− ) ∗ + (1− )
∗
1−  +
( + ˜)
1−  ,
where on the right-hand side the first term is output for Mexican consumers, the second
term is output used as intermediate inputs for production of consumer goods for Mexican
consumers, and the last term is output used as intermediate inputs for production for the
export sector (including the fixed cost).
Zero profits from domestic operations imply (recalling that  =  and () = 1− from
Section 2.5)
(1− ) ∗ + ( + ˜)
1−  =

1−  . (49)
33Of course, Mexican consumer demand also feeds into the demand for Mexican labor, which will put
∗∗ and Π∗ terms on the right-hand side of the equation. Gathering terms and rearranging allows us to
write the condition in the form (47), with only export-driven income terms on the right-hand side.
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This determines the value of  given the other variables. Using expressions we have for  ∗
(namely, (14)) and  (namely, (44)), we obtain
(1− ) (1 +  ∗)
1 + (1− ) ∗ (
∗∗ +Π∗) +  [(1− )()+ ˜] = (1− )
(1− )  .
Further simplifying this expression using (48) yields

1−  =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ
(1− ) [(1− )(1− )(1 +  ∗) + (1 + (1− ) ∗)]
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¶
| {z }
Denote by 
()

−
µ − + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
(1− ) + (1− )(1 + (1− ) ∗)
¶
| {z }
Denote by 
˜.
(50)
This is the second equilibrium condition. We can think of it as roughly a zero-profit condition,
in that it shows the number of firms that must enter in Mexico in order for the cumulated
fixed cost to be equal to the variable profits generated by the domestic demand, from all
sources, for Mexican products, including demand induced indirectly by exports and by the
pre-committed sunk cost. We can put this equation together with (47) to determine ∗ and
 as functions of ˜ and  (remembering that  is also a function of ∗ and  through (11)).
6.3 Main comparative statics result for the case with no FT.
We now put (47) together with (50) to analyze the eﬀects of a change in ˜ inherited from
period 1 and a change in  on period-2 outcomes. The eﬀects diﬀer qualitatively for dif-
ferent parts of the parameter space, and it will be useful to contrast two cases: The case
of ‘weak linkages,’ namely when  is small, so that the Mexican economy cannot improve
its productivity much by producing a wide variety of inputs, and the economy acts like a
neoclassical trade model; and the case of ‘strong linkages,’ in which  and  are both on the
high end of their feasible range and the increasing-returns-to-scale nature of the Mexican
manufacturing sector becomes more important.
The following term will be useful to define for the upcoming analysis.
 ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
(− )
h()
 −˜
i
()+ (− )
h()
 −˜
i
˜
−(1− ) [()+˜]˜,
(51)
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where  and  are defined in (47), and  and  are defined in (50).
First, the comparative statics for ˜:
Proposition 10 In the case without Fast Track, holding  constant, the elasticities of ∗
and  with respect to ˜ can be written as follows.
∗˜ =
(− )
h()
 −˜
i
˜
 ,
˜ =
−
³
(1− ) [()+˜]˜ + (1− )
h()
 −˜
i
˜
´
 ,
and
˜ =
(1− ) [()+˜]˜ + (1− )
h()
 −˜
i
˜
 ,
where  and  are defined in (47),  and  are defined in (50),and  is defined in (51).
In the ‘weak linkages’ limiting case with  close to 0, we have that   0 and
∗˜  0, ˜  0, and ˜  0.
In the ‘strong linkages’ limiting case with  close to 1 and  close to  but still less than
, we have   0 and
∗˜ = 0, ˜ = 1, and ˜ = −1.
Proof. See appendix.
A rise in ˜ is similar to an exogenous increase in the demand for Mexican inputs to
produce the required quality upgrades for export. In the weak-linkages case, this results in
an increase in the price of Mexican inputs due to the increased wage: A greater demand
for inputs increases the demand for labor, raising its price. In the process, the rise in costs
squeezes out non-exporting firms, so  falls. Both the rise in ∗ and the drop in  contribute
to the rise in  (recall (11)). On the other hand, in the strong-linkages case, the economy is
able to respond to this rise in the demand for inputs by generating a wider variety of inputs,
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which meets the extra demand with lower marginal costs. This reflects the strength of the
increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector due to the backward and forward
linkages. Recall the ineﬃciency in the equilibrium noted in the discussion of Proposition 3
when linkages are strong; given the external economies of scale, the economy can become
much more productive if more firms than the equilibrium number enter. Note from (11) that
in the limit with strong linkages  is proportional to ∗ , so ∗˜ = 0 and ˜ = 1 together
imply ˜ = −1.
Next, we need the eﬀects of a period-2 change in :
Proposition 11 In the case without Fast Track, holding ˜ constant, the elasticity of ∗
with respect to  can be written as follows.
∗ =
h
(− )
³()

´
− (1− )˜
i
()− (1− )
³()

´
˜
 ,
 =
(1− ) [()+˜]
³()

´
 ,
and
 =
(1− )
h³()

´
−˜
i
()− (1− ) [()+˜]
³()

´
 ,
where  and  are defined in (47),  and  are defined in (50),and  is defined in (51).
In the ‘weak linkages’ limiting case with  close to 0, this implies that
∗  0,   0, and   0.
In the ‘strong linkages’ limiting case with  close to 1 and  close to  but still less than
, we have
∗ =   0,  = 0, and   0.
Proof. See appendix.
A rise in  diverts some portion of US consumer demand away from Mexican products,
indirectly lowering the demand for Mexican labor. This pushes down the Mexican wage.
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The eﬀect on the number of Mexican firms is more subtle. Other things equal, a drop in the
demand for Mexican products will reduce the number of Mexican firms. Other things equal,
a drop in marginal costs, , will increase the number of Mexican firms. These two eﬀects
can be seen in (49); the left hand side measures the demand for domestic final output and
inputs from Mexican firms, which is reduced by an increase in  (since  lowers  ∗ and
). Other things equal, a drop in that demand lowers . However, from the right hand
side, it is clear that a drop in  will, other things equal, raise . Now, increasing the scope
of ROO’s pushes down ∗, which lowers , so we have two opposing forces on the number of
firms. Recalling (11), the eﬀect of ∗ on  is much larger with strong backward and forward
linkages than it is with weak linkages. As  approaches 1, the elasticity of  with respect
to ∗ approaches unity. What Proposition 11 shows is that when the linkages are weak,
the demand eﬀect dominates, and  falls when  rises; with strong linkages the cost eﬀect
counteracts it, so that in the limit the eﬀect of  on  vanishes.
7 A Punchline.
We can now assemble all of these pieces into a conclusion about the desirability of FT for
cases in which  is not too large. (We will discuss the strong-linkages case in the next
section.) Recall that FT is needed in order to coax Mexico to the table ex ante if and only
if (38) holds. We need to use (28) with (48) and the elasticities in Proposition 10 to figure
out whether Mexican welfare is higher or lower due to the higher value of ˜ if Mexico walks
away from the agreement ex post (recalling that by Proposition 6, ˜(∗)  ˜(1) as long as
∗  1). Indeed, in the small- case, a higher ˜ implies a lower value of  and a higher value
of , so a lower variety of goods to consume and a higher price for each variety. Further, since
˜ is higher, (48) shows that Mexican income is lower. Putting all of these eﬀects together,
Mexicans have lower income, higher consumer prices, and less product variety due to the
productive resources consumed by the higher value of ˜, implying lower welfare, and so (38)
is satisfied. Ex post, the Mexican threat point is worsened by the ex ante expectation of an
agreement, so that the US Congress may be able to extract some additional rents from the
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Mexicans in period 2 without triggering refusal of the agreement.
At the same time, we can use (30) with the elasticities in Proposition 11 to verify that
the US will want to increase  ex post if it can.34 Indeed, by increasing , Congress will
increase  (through increased tariﬀ revenue) and reduce the price of each imported good
(through reduction of ), without sacrificing product variety available to Americans (since ˜
is fixed). By the same token, the increase in  will lower Mexican welfare.
Proposition 12 If    (as in (9)) and  is not too large, then for small values of  the
optimal , ∗, for the US is strictly positive, and gives Mexico the same welfare as it would
have obtained with no agreement. But this value of  cannot be realized in equilibrium without
FT, because if  = ∗ was expected, ex post the US would wish to increase  beyond that
level, and the Mexican government would agree to remain in the agreement. The equilibrium
value of  without FT will be strictly greater than ∗, and Mexican utility will be strictly
less than with no agreement and no expectation of an agreement.
Proof. See appendix.
This is the hold-up problem at work. Under these conditions, Mexico would never agree
to negotiations in the absence of FT.
8 The Case With Strong Backward and Forward Link-
ages.
Now, we can address how the model works in the strong linkages case. The behavior of the
model is qualitatively diﬀerent when linkages are strong, in ways that may help understand
trade policy in practice.
34We should underline the diﬀerent roles of the two propositions. Proposition 11 shows how things change
when the US Congress changes  ex post, with ˜ unchanged; this is used to check whether or not the
Congress would wish to change  if it is not constrained by FT. Proposition 10 shows how things change
with a higher value of ˜, due to the anticipation of a lower value of , holding the actual value of  constant;
this is used to check whether or not the Mexican utility constraint will be slack, per (38), so that the US
Congress would be able to increase  ex post.
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Proposition 13 If    (as in (9)) and  is not too large, then if  is close to 1 and 
is close to , the optimal , ∗, for the US is strictly positive, and gives Mexico the same
welfare as it would have obtained with no agreement. But this value of  cannot be realized
in equilibrium without FT, because if  = ∗ was expected, ex post the Mexican government
would be willing to walk away from the agreement unless  was lowered below ∗.
This can be seen very simply from the results in Proposition 10. In the strong-linkages
case, the increased ˜ that results from Mexican businesses anticipating the agreement has no
eﬀect on Mexican incomes. Since in the limit the elasticity of  with respect to ˜ approaches
−1, the ˜ in (48) is unchanged, and so Mexican income in unchanged. However, the variety
of manufactured products  goes up and the price of each one of them goes down (since 
falls), so, by (28), Mexican welfare rises with an increase in ˜ for any given trade policy.
Consequently, Mexican threat-point welfare goes up, and Mexico will no longer be willing to
accept  = ∗ in period 2 if it is possible to change it.
The implication of Proposition 13 for FT is that if an agreement is anticipated between the
US and Mexico in the presence of strong linkages, the resulting increase in ˜ will strengthen
Mexico’s bargaining power. Therefore, Congress will want Fast Track, but it will not be
because of a hold-up problem suﬀered by Mexico: It will be to avoid being held up by Mexico.
Mexico would have no need to insist on Fast Track as a precondition for negotiations.
9 Conclusion.
The mechanism studied here can be summarized as follows, for cases when  is not too large,
so that backward and forward linkages are weak.
(i) Under full commitment (which here means under FT), the optimal policy for the US
in designing a free-trade agreement with Mexico is to set maximal ROO’s on a subset  of
industries, to claw back the tariﬀ preference de facto that the free trade agreement creates,
while setting minimal ROO’s on the remaining industries. It is not optimal to distort any
industry’s actual input use with an ROO.
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(ii) There is an optimal level of  from the point of view of US welfare, which is either
 = 0 or  = 1. In the empirically more interesting case where  = 1 is preferred,
Mexico’s participation constraint will be binding, so the optimal choice of  becomes the
value, ∗  1, under which Mexico’s welfare from the agreement is equal to its status-quo
welfare.
(iii) However, it cannot achieve this optimal policy in the absence of commitment (in
other words, without FT). The reason is that if Mexican businesses anticipate  = ∗, more
of them will invest in quality upgrades for the US market than would have done so under the
status quo, and so their government’s ex post bargaining power will be worse. As a result,
at the last minute Congress will be able to raise  above ∗ somewhat and the Mexican
government will still accept the amended agreement.
(iv) Anticipating this, Mexico will refuse to enter negotiations unless FT is in place first.
On the other hand, when backward and forward linkages are large, the hold-up problem
is flipped on its head: Mexico’s bargaining position is improved ex post by the additional
industrial development that comes from an anticipated trade agreement, and it is in a position
to demand more from the US than it could have demanded ex ante. As a result, in this case
the US will be the one to insist on FT.
This contrast between the workings of the cases with strong and weak linkages may
help explain the anomalous cases of the Canada-US Auto Pact and the TPP, as mentioned
in the Introduction. If weak linkages lead to FT because the US can hold up its trade
partner, and strong linkages lead to FT because the trade partner can hold up the US, it is
conceivable that there is an intermediate level of linkages where there is no hold-up problem
in either direction and the optimal agreement is time-consistent (to a close approximation).
Recalling (from Section 2.6) that the strength of linkages tends to be highly correlated with a
country’s level of development, this could explain how these two agreements, both primarily
with countries at a similar level of development, could have been negotiated without FT.
Conceivably both Canada and Japan (the key negotiating partner in the TPP) are at such
an intermediate level of linkages where the hold-up problem cancels out, while Mexico and
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less developed economies have weaker linkages that create the regular hold-up problem; and
perhaps no country has such strong linkages that the reverse hold-up problem arises.35 (The
case of Jordan would need a separate explanation.)
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2. It will be convenient to focus on elasticities. In general, we will
denote the elasticity of a variable  with respect to a variable  by .
If we denote the total quantity of intermediates produced in Mexico by  , the total
value of intermediates in Mexico is given by  . This has two parts: (1) the value of
intermediates produced in Mexico for final goods,  and, (2) the value of intermediates
produced in Mexico for production of intermediates,  . Hence,  ≡  +  , and
we must have  = ( +  ). (Note that this uses the fact that rules of origin do not
distort input use away from cost minimization in the production of inputs, but only in the
production of final goods for export.) Consequently,  = ((1 − )) and the total
value of intermediates is equal to (1(1 − )) . We compute  in four parts. (i) The
value of final goods produced and consumed in Mexico amounts to (1− ) ∗, so the value
of intermediates used to produce those amounts to (1 − ) ∗. (ii) The value of final
goods produced in Mexico for export in industries where the ROO is ignored amounts to
(1− )(1 + ) per industry (there are  of them), and the value of intermediates for this
portion of demand amounts to (1−)(1+ ). (iii) The value of final goods produced
in Mexico for export in industries where the ROO does not bind amounts to (1 − )
per industry (there are (1 − )(1 − ) of them), and the value of intermediates for this
portion of demand amounts to (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ) . (iv) The value of final goods
35Alternatively, it is possible that there are countries with strong linkages to that extreme degree but
that the US does not wish to sign trade agreements with them. It can be shown in our model that if 
is close enough to  and  is close enough to 1, then reductions in ∗ will paradoxically lower US utility.
This is because lowering Mexico’s tariﬀ will lower Mexican income, thereby lowering  and raising Mexican
marginal costs, which increases the price charged to US consumers. As a result, in this case of extremely
strong linkages, the US would not want a trade agreement with Mexico. This is another special feature of
the model that would likely change if we introduced a sector in the US that produces inputs for Mexican
manufactures.
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produced in Mexico for export in industries where the ROO does bind amount to (1− )
per industry (there are (1−) of them), and the value of Mexican intermediates plus labor
used to produce this portion of demand amounts to (1 − )(1 − ) . As discussed in
Section 3.1, for these products, the ratio of the value of Mexican-produced inputs to the
value of labor plus Mexican-produced inputs will be (1− + ) = (1− (1− )).36
Therefore, the value of intermediates used to produce this portion of demand amounts to
(1−) [(1− (1− ))] (1− ) .37
Consequently, the value of inputs produced in Mexico is the sum of (i) through (iv),
divided by (1− )
 ≡  +  = (1− ) 1−
h
 ∗ +
³
1+(1−)
1+
´
 + (1−)
³

1−(1−) − 1
´

i
.
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Next we derive the labor demand. The portion of labor demand that is due to production
of inputs in Mexico is equal to (1− ) times the expression just derived. The demand due
to production of final good for Mexican consumers is (1− ) (1− ) ∗, the demand due to
production of non-ROO-compliant exports is  (1− ) (1−)(1+), and the demand due
to exports for which the ROO is non-binding is (1−)(1−) (1− ) (1−) . The demand
for labor due to production of exports that comply with the ROO is (1−)[ (1− ) (1−
(1 − ))](1 − ) .38 Putting these pieces together and simplifying, the demand for labor
must be
∗∗ = (1− ) 1−
1−
h
 ∗ +
³
1+(1−)
1+
´
 + (1−)
³

1−(1−) − 1
´

i
.
36Recall that due to Cobb-Douglas production, to satisfy the ROO, labor and local input would be increased
by the same proportion per unit of output.
37Mathematically,
+∗++∗ =  and +∗ = 1−(1−) , so ++∗ = 1−(1−) .
38Since for these exports,
+∗++∗ =  and ++∗ = 1−(1−) , so 
∗
++∗ =
(1−)
1−(1−) .
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Using (13), (14), and the fact that Π∗ = 0 in equilibrium, this expression becomes
∗ =
³
(1−)(1−)(1+(1−)∗)
(1−)+(1−)(1+(1−)∗)
´³ +()
[1−(1−)][1+(1−(1−))]
´

∗ , (53)
where
 ≡ (1− (1− ))(1 + (1−) − (1−)(1 + )), and
() ≡ (1−)(1 + ). (54)
Since   1− (1− ), it is then immediate that
∗ = ()+()  0, (55)
which implies ∗  0.
The proof will proceed from a derivation of the demand for inputs from non-member
economies. The portion of that demand that is due to production of inputs in Mexico is
equal to (1 − ) times the expression given in (52). The demand due to production of
final good for Mexican consumers is (1 − )(1 − ) ∗, the demand due to production of
non-ROO-compliant exports is (1−)(1−)(1+), and the demand due to exports for
which the ROO is non-binding is (1−)(1−)(1− )(1−) . The demand for imported
inputs due to production of exports that comply with the ROO is (1−)(1− )(1−) ,
since for those firms the share of costs due to Mexican labor and Mexican-produced inputs
will be exactly . Putting these pieces together and simplifying, the total demand for non-
member-produced inputs must be
 = 1−1−
h
(1− )
³
 ∗ +
³
1+(1−)
1+
´

´
− (1−)(1− )
³

1−(1−) − 1
´

i
.
(56)
Now, substituting (13), (14), and (53) into (56), it is straightforward to confirm that
 = −(1−)
³(1−)(1−)
1−(1−)
´³
1+
1+(1−(1−))
´³
1
(1−)+(1−)(1+(1−)∗)
´
 0.
Turning attention to the number of firms, , final consumption demand for Mexican products
by Mexican consumers ((1−) ∗) plus the total revenue from sales of inputs within Mexico
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as derived from (52) yields
=
1− 
1− 
∙
 ∗ + 
µ
1 + (1−)
1 + 
¶
 + (1−)
µ 
1− (1− ) − 1
¶

¸
.
This is the total revenue from domestic sales of Mexican firms. Multiplying this revenue by
(1−) yields variable profits (using Section 2.5), which must then be equal to the aggregate
of fixed costs incurred by Mexican firms in equilibrium,  (recall that  is denoted in
units of output). Using, (13), (14) and (53) and rearranging this condition gives
 =
³
(1−)(1−)(1+∗)+(1+(1−)∗)
(1−)+(1−)(1+(1−)∗)
´³
(1−)(1−)
[1−(1−)][1+(1−(1−))]
´³+()
()
´

∗ ,
where  and () are defined in (54).
Note that  has been written as a function of  because it depends on ∗ and , which
are aﬀected by . Consequently, we can write  = ()+() − . Recalling (11), we also
know that  = −
³
1−

´³ 
1−
´
 +
³
1−
1−
´
∗. Combining these two equations and
using the expression in (55)
 =
µ(1− )
− 
¶ ()
+()  0, (57)
given that   , as assumed in (9). Finally,   0, which implies that   0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Recalling that  = −
³
1−

´³ 
1−
´
 +
³
1−
1−
´
∗, using
the expressions for ∗ and  derived at (55) and (57), we obtain
 =
µ(1− (1− ))− 
− 
¶ ()
+() .
Since    (due to (9)),   0 if and only if
   (1− )
1−  ,
which is guaranteed to hold when   . ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. We can use equations (13), (25), (26) and (27) to obtain
˜ =
µ
1 + (1−)
1 + (1−(1− ))
¶
(1− )(1− )  ,
= (1− )(1− )() , by definition of () given in (18).
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Then, the elasticity of ˜ with respect  is given by
˜ =  − .
Using equation (23), we obtain
˜ =
µ(1− )
− 
¶
  0,
since (9) is assumed and   0 as shown in (22). ¥
Proof of Proposition 8.
In this proof, we will show that assumption (9) is required to justify the US having
positive tariﬀs when there is no agreement. We continue to use the notation  to denote
the elasticity of the equilibrium value of  with respect to . Using (13), (11), and (17), we
derive
 =
µ 
1 + 
¶ (1− )
1 + [1−(1− )] ,
 =
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗ −
µ
1− 

¶µ 
1− 
¶
 , and
∗ =  = − (1 + [1−(1− )])(1 + (1−))  0.
Further, (19) implies
 = (1− )− 
µ
 −
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗
¶
=
(1− )
−    0,
given (20). Combining these with (30), we can derive
  =
µ (1− )
[1 + (1−(1− )) ]
¶
Φ( ),
where
Φ( ) = 1− (1− )− [1 + (1−(1− )) ]
1 +  +
 [(1− (1− ))− ]
(1 + (1−))(− ) .
The elasticity   has the same sign as Φ( ). It is easy to verify that Φ  0 and
Φ ( = 0)  0. This means if there is a value of  , say   that makes Φ = 0, then   is
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the optimal tariﬀ maximizing the US welfare. In addition, Φ is increasing in , therefore
  is increasing in . When  = 1, we have
  ( = 1) = − (1− ) .
This is positive if and only if   , giving the result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 9. From (34), the derivative of US welfare with respect to  under
FT has the same sign as
Ψ ( ) ≡ 
1+(1−(1−))
³
1− (1− ) + (1+)((1−(1−))−)
(1+(1−))(−)
´
− log(1 + ),
where Ψ  0 and Ψ (0 ) = 0. In addition, we have
Ψ
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
³
1
1+(1−(1−))
´2 ³
1− (1− ) + (1+)[(1−(1−))−]
(1+(1−))(−)
´
+ [(1−(1−))−]
[1+(1−(1−)) ][1+(1−) ]2(−) − 11+ .
Evaluating this derivative at  = 0, we obtain
Ψ
 |=0 =
(− )
−  ,
which is positive if    and negative if   .39 ¥
Proof of Proposition 10. By equation (47),
∗∗ = ()+˜, (58)
39Furthermore, it is easy to see that 2Ψ  0. As a result, given that Ψ (0 ) = 0, the parameter space in
which Ψ |=0  0 provides a suﬃcient condition for the U.S. welfare to be increasing in . Thus, evaluating
Ψ
 at  = 0, we have
Ψ
 |=0 =
µ
1
1 + 
¶2µ
1− (1− ) +  [(1− (1− ))− ]
(− )
¶
− 1
1 +  ,
which implies that
Ψ
 |=0  0 if  
(− )
−  .
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where   0, and 0    1.
Diﬀerentiating (58) with respect to ˜, we obtain
∗
˜ =

∗ +
˜
∗

˜
=

∗
µ
1 +

˜
˜

¶
.
We multiply both sides by ˜∗ to get
˜
∗
∗
˜ =
˜
∗∗
µ
1 +

˜
˜

¶
.
Writing this expression in elasticity form and using (58), we obtain
∗˜ = ˜()+˜
¡
1 + ˜
¢
.
The elasticity of marginal cost with respect to ˜ can be obtained by using (11)
˜ =
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗˜ −
µ
1− 

¶µ 
1− 
¶
˜. (59)
Using (59) and isolating ∗˜ yields
∗˜ = (1− )˜(1− )()+ (1− )˜
µ
1−  (1− )
(1− ) ˜
¶
. (60)
Similarly, from (50)
 =
µ
1− 

¶µ()
 −˜
¶
, (61)
where   0, and 
(
> 0 for  ≤ (1−)(1+∗)
1+(1−)∗ ,
 0 for   (1−)(1+∗)
1+(1−)∗ .
Diﬀerentiating (61) with respect to ˜, we obtain

˜ = −
1− 

µ()
2

˜ +
¶
.
We multiply both sides by ˜ to get
˜


˜ = −
1− 

1

µ()

˜


˜ +˜
¶
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Writing this expression in elasticity form and using (61), we obtain
˜ = − 1()
 −˜
µ()
 ˜ +˜
¶
.
Using (59) and isolating ˜ yields
˜ = − 
(− )() − (1− )˜
∙
(1− )() ∗˜ + (1− )˜
¸
. (62)
Solving (60) and (62) gives us ∗˜ and ˜ provided in the proposition. Then, one can use
these together with (59) to obtain ˜ given in the proposition.
To see the limiting results, first it is easy to check that the limit of  (where  is defined
in (51)) as  → 0 is positive. The limit of  as  → 1 and  →  is
−(1− )(1− )2(1 +  ∗)()˜
  0 (63)
For  close to 0, the numerator of ∗˜ is positive (using (61), since   0) and the numerator
of ˜ is negative (using (58) and (61), since   0 and ∗∗  0, as well as   0 when 
close to 0). As  → 1 and  → , the numerator of ∗˜ approaches 0 and the numerator of
˜ converges to (63). ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Diﬀerentiating (58) with respect to , we obtain
∗
 =
()
∗
1
()
()
 +
˜
∗
1


 .
We multiply both sides by ∗ to get

∗
∗
 =
()
∗∗

()
()
 +
˜
∗∗



 .
Writing this expression in elasticity form and using (58), we obtain
∗ = ()()+˜  +
˜
()+˜ .
The elasticity of marginal cost with respect to  can be obtained by using (11)
 =
µ
1− 
1− 
¶
∗ −
µ
1− 

¶µ 
1− 
¶
. (64)
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Using (64) and isolating ∗ yields
∗ =
(1− )
h
() −˜
³
1−

´³

1−
´

i
(1− )()+ (1− )˜ . (65)
Similarly, diﬀerentiating (61) with respect to , we obtain

 =
µ
1− 

¶ ()

µ
1
()
()
 −
1



¶
We multiply both sides by  to get



 =
µ
1− 

¶ ()

1

µ 
()
()
 −




¶
.
Writing this expression in elasticity form and using (61), we obtain
 =
()

()
 −˜
¡ − ¢
Using (64) and isolating  yields
 = 
()

£
(1− )  − (1− ) ∗
¤
(− )
³()

´
− (1− )˜
. (66)
Solving (65) and (66) gives us ∗ and  provided in the proposition. Then, one can use
these together with (64) to obtain  given in the proposition.
To see the limiting results as  → 0, note that in the limit the numerators of the expres-
sions for both ∗ and  are positive (using (58), since ∗∗  0 and using (61), since
  0), as is the denominator (as noted in the proof of the previous proposition; recall that
the denominators are the same). Since   0, the result is straightforward. It is easy to
confirm that the limit of the numerator of ∗ as  → 1 and  →  is the same as the limit
of , (63), while the limit of the numerator of  is 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 12. Under the given conditions, from Proposition 9 the optimal
 for the US will be positive, and will equate Mexico’s utility under the agreement with
Mexico’s utility without an agreement. Call this value ∗. If all participants expect ∗ in
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period 1 but the US is able to change it in period 2, we will verify that the US will indeed
want to increase it.
The US welfare without FT requires a slight change in the computation of the consumer
price index in the US. Suppose that ¯ industries expect an ROO ex ante, and ex post, a
total of  = ¯+  industries are subject to an ROO. The  term is, if positive, the number
of industries that are surprised by an ROO ex post, and if negative, the number of industries
that expected an ROO but were pleasantly surprised to be exempted from the ROO ex
post. Under FT,  = 0 by assumption, but without FT we must have  = 0 in equilibrium.
Each variety in an industry  without a rule of origin sells for a price of  in the US, while
each variety sold under a rule of origin will sell for a price (1 + ). Assume that  ≥ 0
for concreteness; the case of   0 is analogous and produces the same equation. We can
divide the industries into three groups. The first group consists of (1− ¯− ) industries that
were expecting to be exempt from ROO and were not surprised. The price index for each
of those industries’ composite goods in the US (see (7)) is  = ¡˜¢−1 . The second
group consists of  industries that were not expecting an ROO but had one imposed on them
anyway. The price index for each of those composite goods is  = ¡˜¢−1 (1 + ). The
third group consists of ¯ industries that expected and received an ROO. The price index for
the composite good for each of those industries is  = ¡˜¢−1 (1 + ). Consequently, the
log of the price in the US of composite imported goods from Mexico is ln( ) = R 1
0
ln() =
(1−¯−) ln
³¡˜¢ −1 ´+ ln³¡˜¢−1 (1 + )´+¯ ln³¡˜¢−1 (1 + )´, so (recalling
that ˜ = ˜(1 + ))
 = (1 + ) ¯+ ¡˜¢−1 .
Therefore, we can write the US welfare without FT as
 = ³
(1 + ) ¯ + (˜) −1 
´1− . (67)
The elasticity of US welfare with respect to  in period 2 without FT,  , can be found
from (67), remembering that in period 2 ˜ (and thus ˜) is fixed and we change  by
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changing  while holding ¯ constant.40 This elasticity can be written as
 |¯ constant =  − (1− ) log(1 + )− (1− ),
recalling that the price of each product is equal to  .  is provided in proposition 11. Also,
 and  take the same value when FT holds as when FT does not hold, and are given
by (22) and (33), respectively. As a result, in the limit as  → 0,   can be written as
 |¯ constant = (1− )Ω(  ),
where
Ω (  ) ≡ 
1+(1−(1−))
³
1 + (1+)
1+(1−)
(1−)()
()+˜
´
− log(1 + ).
Note that Ω (0  ) = 0. In addition, taking the derivative of Ω (   ) with respect to 
and evaluating at  = 0, we obtain
Ω(  )
 |=0 =
 (1− )
+ ˜  0,
where () = 1 when  = 0. Therefore, for a range of values for  including  = 0,
 |¯ constant  0, implying that US welfare increases with .
This shows that in the indicated part of the parameter space the US will wish to increase
 in period 2 if that is possible. Now, to confirm that it will be possible, we need only
to check that (38) holds, which amounts to checking that the higher level of ˜ that obtains
because of Mexico’s prior expectation of an agreement results in lower utility if the agreement
is nullified compared to the case in which there had never been an agreement. We can use
the results from Proposition 10 to check this. First, from the expression for ˜, it is easy
to confirm that as  → 0, ˜  0, so as ˜ goes up ˜ also goes up. Therefore, from (48),
we can see that  ∗ is decreasing in ˜ (recall (14)). From (28), seeing that an increase in ˜
reduces  ∗ and  but increases  (since it increases ) ensures that Mexican utility is reduced
by an increase in ˜, and so (38) is satisfied.
40This means the derivative of  with respect to , holding ¯ constant, is equal to the derivative of 
with respect to , holding all else constant.
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